International economic highlights 1993 by NU. CEPAL. Oficina de Washington
UNITED NATIONS
ECONOMIC COMMISSION  




LIM ITED  
L C /W A S /L .23  






I. THE W ORLD ECONOM Y
1. M oderate Optim ism for 1 9 9 3  .....................................................................................................3
2 . W orld Economic Outlook (W EO) U p d a te d ............................................................................. 4
3. The IM F's First W EO ......................................................................................................................6
4 . The Tokyo Sum m it .........................................................................................................................8
5. The IM F's Second WEO ...................................................   10
6 . The APEC Meeting ...................................................................................................................... 12
II. THE U .S . ECONOM Y
1. President Bush's Economic Valedictory .............................................................................. 14
2. President Clinton's Economic P a c k a g e ................................................................................. 16
III. U .S .-JA PA N  ECONOM IC RELATIONS
1. Negotiating the U .S .-Japan Fram ework for a
N ew  Economic P a rtn e rs h ip .....................................  18
2. Implementing the U .S .-Japan Economic Fram ework .................................................... 19
IV. THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
1. Prospects for the Developing Economies ...........................................................................2 2
2. The Fourth Growth Pole ..............................................................................................................2 3
3 . Health and Developm ent ........................................................................... 25
4 . The East Asian Miracle ..............................................................................................................27
5. Poverty Reduction in East Asia: The Real Miracle ..........................................................2 9
V . CAPITAL FLOW S TO THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
1. Remember the Debt Crisis? .....................................................................................................31
2. External Finance and Developm ent ...................................................................................... 3 3
3 . The Commercial Banks W an t G u a ra n te e s ...........................................................................3 4
4 . Private M arket Financing for Developing Countries .......................................................3 6
5. A N ew  Pattern of Developing Country F in a n c in g .............................................................38
PRESENTATION ....................................................................................     1
VI. TRADE
1. President Clinton On T r a d e ........................................................................................................4 0
2 . The U .S . Trade Policy Agenda for 1 9 9 3  ...........................................................................  4 2
3 . Barriers to  U .S . Exports ............................................................................................................. 4 3
V II. The NORTH AM ERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA)
1. President Clinton's Inter-Am erican Policy ...........................................................................4 6
2 . The Opposition ...............................................................................................................................4 8
3 . The Vote .......................................................................................................................................... 4 9
V III. BEYOND NAFTA
1. The Institutional Dimension ..................................................................................................... 52
2 . The Accession Clause .................................................................................................................53
3 . The Need for Leadership ........................................................................................................... 55
IX . M ULTILATERAL FINANCIAL IN S T ITU TIO N S
1. Soul Searching at the W orld Bank ..........................................................................................58
2 . The IM F-W orld Bank Spring M eetings ................................................................................. 59
3 . 'G etting Results' at the W orld Bank ....................................................................................61
4 . The IM F 's  Annual Report ...........................................   63
5. The W orld Bank's Annual Report ..........................................................................................65
6 . The IM F-W orld Bank Annual M eetings ................................................................................. 66
PRESENTATION
This is the seventh year that the w eekly  dispatches transm itted during a year by 
ECLAC W ashington to  ECLAC Santiago, and to other subregional offices, are gathered in a 
single docum ent.1
For their presentation here, the dispatches are classified by subject and ordered 
chronologically w ithin each chapter, w ith  each heading indicating the relative saliency of 
those issues w ithin the international economic agenda.
The three most im portant issues th a t dominated the international economic agenda, 
throughout the concluding year, are listed here according to  w h a t, avow edly, is a very  
subjective ordering of their relative importance.
1) The inauguration of President Clinton initiated w h at appeared as a year of 
introversion, plagued w ith  exhausting and barely w on battles. H ow ever, contrary to  
projections based on this initial perform ance, by the end of the year President Clinton 
achieved a "triple play" in the field of international trade, amid several signals th a t the U.S. 
econom y was entering sustainedly the path tow ard strong reactivation.
2) The "triple play" in international trade consisted of three decisive events. First, 
the approval, a fter an intense and fascinating debate, of the North Am erican Free Trade  
Agreem ent (N A FTA ). Second, the turn tow ard the Pacific Rim, w ith  the G-Seven Tokyo  
Sum m it and the more recent meeting in Seattle of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation  
(APEC) forum. And third, the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round.
3) Finally, for the developing econom ies, despite the prolonged slump experienced  
in Japan, Germ any and the United S tates, a new  pattern of private m arket financing began 
to  em erge. This new  pattern, characterized by the securitization of flow s, w ith  
disintermediation by the commercial banks, promised to entail less system ic risks than the  
bank credit flow s that prevailed in the previous decades.
Some of these issues w ere described in the w eekly  dispatches transm itted regularly 
throughout the year. They are gathered here w ith  the purpose of making them  available 
for easier consultation, in case the W ashington D.C . vantage point they present still has 
some testimonial value.
To conclude, those readers w ho are not familiarized w ith  them  should be reminded  
that each dispatch tries to  remain within the self-imposed limit of 7 5 0  w ords, because their 
purpose is only to  bring an issue to  the reader's attention.
1 ECLAC  Washington, International Economic Highlights. 1987  (LC/WAS/L.2) 17 August 
1988; 1988  (LC/WAS/L.4) 17 March 1989; 1989 (LC/WAS/L.8) 15 March 1990; 1990  




I. THE WORLD ECONOMY
I. 1. MODERATE O P TIM IS M  FOR 1 9 9 3  
(W D W /1 /9 3  20  JA N U A R Y 1 9 9 3 )
Three major factors are contributing to  the m oderate optimism w hich presently 
prevails among decision-makers and forecasters. First, the reactivation of the U .S . 
econom y is still perceived as m oderate; second, the degree to w hich the slump in Japan  
and Germ any will influence the pace of w orldw ide reactivation; and third, the expectation  
about the new  economic team  which today starts managing the U .S . econom y.
Despite the relatively good new s about the perform ance of the U .S . econom y during 
the third quarter of 1 9 9 2 , w hen grow th of GDP am ounted to  3 .4  percent, there seems to  
exist consensus among private as well as public forecasters th a t the econom y will continue 
growing at a moderate pace in 1 9 9 3 .
For instance, the outgoing Council of Economic Advisers estim ates th a t "during 
1 9 9 3 , the econom y is expected to  grow at a m oderate pace early in the year and then pick 
up later in the year, w ith real GDP growing around 3 percent during the year."
Private forecasters coincide. According to  the semiannual survey carried out by The 
W all S treet Journal among forty-four economists, the consensus forecast is that "the 
econom y, a fter adjusting for inflation, will expand at a 2 .8 %  annual rate in the first half 
and a 3 .2 %  clip in the second." Furthermore, "all 4 4  econom ists predict the econom y will 
be recession-free for at least the next 12 months."
The sluggishness of the U .S . recovery, to  w hich some observers attribute a decisive 
role in the November electoral outcom e, still remains a puzzle. As adm itted by the outgoing 
Council of Economic Advisers, "the pace of grow th during the recent recovery has been 
much slower than it was during other postwar recoveries." W hile "grow th averaged about 
9 percent during the first year and a half after previous troughs," this tim e, "real GDP 
increased only 2 .9  percent, less than one-third the post w ar average."
The second factor contributing to  m oderate optimism is the even more sluggish 
performance of the other industrialized economies, particularly of Germ any and Japan, as 
w ell as among other m embers of the Group of Seven (G -7). For instance, both Germ any  
and Japan entered into recession during 1 9 9 2  and the United Kingdom remained in 
recession as w ell. Canada resumed grow th at a slow pace, while sluggish grow th rates of 
betw een 1 to 2 percent persisted throughout 1 9 9 2  in France and Italy.
A t issue is the increasing role of exports in the performance of the U .S . econom y, 
which have risen from 8 percent of real GDP in 1 9 8 7  to  over 11 percent in 1 9 9 1 , 
representing about 2 0  percent of U .S. industrial output. Rising exports w ere one of the key 
factors in moderating the im pact of the last recession, generating 1 .5  million jobs from  
1 9 8 9  to  1 9 9 1 . H ow ever, the most positive trend in U .S . exports next year is in Latin
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Am erica, w here they are expected to  continue growing at least a t the spectacular pace of 
2 2  percent at w hich they grew  last year. O ther positive grow th projections on U .S . exports 
are less impressive but still encouraging, such as to East Asia, w ithout Japan, w here they  
are expected to  grow at 6 .7  percent and to  Canada a t alm ost 8 percent. M eanw hile , U .S . 
exports to  the European Com m unity and Japan are expected to  remain as fla t as they w ere  
in 1 9 9 2 .
Finally, the last factor contributing to m oderate optimism comes from the  
expectation generated by the incoming econom ic team . As described by The W ashington  
Post, earlier than expected, "reality " is already melting some of the new  Adm inistration's  
cam paign promises.
First of all, based on w orst than expected new s about the budget defic it, the new  
Adm inistration has reconsidered its promise of cutting the budget deficit in half during the 
next four years. Second, another casualty im m ediately caused by the bad new s about the  
deficit is the promised tax cut for the middle class, because of the need to  raise new  
revenue.
Finally, the same fa te  seems to  a w a it the "stimulus package," promised in the form  
of a "Rebuild Am erica Fund" to  spend $ 8 0  billion in the next four years in public works. 
This proposal has placed the new  Adm inistration already at loggerheads w ith  the Federal 
Reserve Board's concern w ith  keeping the reactivation at a pace which preserves the  
m oderate rates of inflation w hich presently prevail. For this purpose, in 1 9 9 3 , the Fed is 
aiming at low er target ranges in the grow th  of the m oney supply to  underscore the Fed's 
com m itm ent to  lower inflation. Such tightness from the Fed would only be consistent w ith  
the fac t th a t in 1 9 9 2  the m oney supply, as measured by M 2 , grew  only a t 2.1 percent, 
below the range of 2 .5  to 6 .5  percent originally set.
To overcome the standoff, one of the most prominent supporters of President-elect 
Clinton, Nobel Laureate and M IT  Professor Paul Samuelson recently proposed a new  "social 
com pact." Professor Samuelson said "the new  President and Congress should try  to  strike 
a deal w ith  the Federal Reserve: if the central bank agrees to low er interest rates, the  
president and Congress should promise in turn to  adopt tough m easures to  cut the deficit."  
H ow ever, Professor Samuelson concluded, "I have no confidence that the Federal Reserve 
would agree to  such a social com pact." Consequently, he endorsed w h at he characterized  
as "a second-best policy of short-term  fiscal expansionism," as opposed to  "tolerating the 
slow  pace of the current econom ic recovery."
These are some of the factors responsible for the m oderate optimism presently 
prevailing. S tay tuned.
I. 2 . W O RLD ECONOM IC OUTLOOK (W EO) UPDATED  
(W D W /7 /9 3  2 4  FEBRUARY 1 9 9 3 )
It is uncommon for the s ta ff of the International M onetary Fund (IM F) to update the  
W EO . Usually, the W EO is released regularly in M ay and October, for the spring and annual
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IMF-W orld Bank meetings. Something unusual or unanticipated m ust happen, to  force the 
revision of the forecast and the release of an updated version. In the present case, the  
"w eaker-than-expected activity" in the industrialized countries, as w ell as the tensions in 
foreign exchange m arkets, "have cast new  doubts on the prospects for recovery in the  
industrial world after w h at had already been tw o  years of w eak  grow th or recession in 
m any countries."
The W EO 's "interim assessm ent," released to  the press on 2 2  Decem ber 1 9 9 2  and 
published in late January 1 9 9 3 , contains the following chapters: I) Recent Developm ents  
and Short-Term  Prospects, examines exchange m arket developm ents, the stance of fiscal 
and m onetary policies, and the revised projections for the industrial and developing 
countries, as well as for the form er centrally planned economies; II) M acroeconom ic  
Imbalances and Financial Strains, focuses on the factors underlying recent exchange  
m arket turbulence in Europe, m edium -term  consequences of the budget defic it in the  
United S tates, and the ongoing process of asset price and balance sheet adjustm ent; and 
III) Policy Implications, discusses system ic issues, requirements in individual countries, as 
well as economic confidence and the need to strengthen international cooperation. Finally, 
an annex is dedicated to the Stance of M onetary Policy and a box presents a detailed  
chronology of the events preceding and following the Septem ber 1 9 9 2  crisis in the  
European M onetary System (EMS).
The "interim assessment" is dedicated primarily to the major industrial countries, 
updating the projections for approxim ately 3 0  of the largest econom ies, w hich account for 
85  percent of world output. "A more com plete analysis of the outlook for the developing 
countries and for the form er centrally planned economies" will be included in the next 
W EO 's regular edition, to be released in M ay 1 9 9 3 . In the updated version, the projections 
for these last countries w ere only "updated increm entally to  reflect changes in global 
economic conditions."
T w o  reasons are offered to explain w hat the updated W EO characterizes as "the 
pervasive sluggishness of grow th." First, "the m ost im portant is the deflationary im pact in 
a number of countries of balance sheet adjustments by the private sector following the  
recent correction of inflated asset prices." And second, the "negative e ffec ts  of high 
interest rates in Europe, stemming from the strong fiscal expansion that accompanied  
German unification, and inadequate progress tow ards inflation convergence and budgetary 
consolidation in a number of countries."
The influence of these factors reflects itself in the revised projections. In the  
industrial countries, real GDP is estim ated to have increased by 1 1 /2  percent in 1 9 9 2 ,  
projected to  rise by 2 percent in 1 9 9 3 , which amounts to  a revision dow nw ards of 1 /2  of 
1 percentage point in 1 9 9 2  and 1 percentage point in 1 9 9 3 . These changes in 1 9 9 3  
include "dow nw ard revisions of 2 percentage points for Germany; 1 to  3 /4  of 1 percentage  
point for Japan, France, Italy, and Canada; and 3 /4  of 1 percentage point for the United  
Kingdom." The outlook for the United States remains essentially unchanged, w ith  real GDP  
rising at an annual rate of almost 4  percent in the third quarter of 1 9 9 2 .
In the developing countries, the slow dow n in the industrial countries in 1 9 9 3 , added 
to  w eaker com m odity prices, are "expected to be partially o ffset by the beneficial e ffects
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of low er world interest rates and, for oil importing countries, by som ew hat low er oil 
prices."
The "largest revisions" w ere m ade in the W estern  Hem isphere, "w here real output 
is now  projected to increase by only 2 percent in 1 9 9 3 ,"  roughly half of w h a t w as  
projected in October. This is mainly the result of "a sharp dow nw ard revision for Brazil 
attributable to political difficulties in implementing a m acroeconomic stabilization program." 
Relatively smaller revisions for other developing countries take into account factors such as 
"an erosion of com petitiveness, declining term s of trade, and a slow dow n in direct 
investm ent and other capital inflow s." H ow ever, "recent debt reductions and the pursuit of 
sound policies" contribute to a favorable m edium -term  outlook.
Finally, the chapter on "policy considerations," addresses the concern "that the  
m edium -term  strategy pursued since the early 1 9 8 0 s  is not living up to  its promises and 
th a t a d ifferent approach is w arranted ." For the IM F sta ff, it is "inappropriate to  conclude 
that the strategy has failed." Rather, "the problem" is that "key aspects of the strategy  
have not been im plem ented." Examples of some of these "policy failures" are found in 
North Am erica and many European countries, in the form of "missed opportunities to  
consolidate budgetary positions;" in Europe, "continued high levels of unem ploym ent point 
to  the urgent need for labor m arket reform s;" in the "failure to  adjust m acroeconom ic  
policies and the lack of adequate prudential oversight" to support the "far reaching 
liberalization of financial m arkets;" as w ell as in "im portant setbacks in the area of trade, 
mainly in the form of quantitative restrictions and other nontariff distortions."
For these reasons, the updated W EO  concludes that "the unfinished agenda of the 
1 9 8 0 s  remains a valuable guide for tackling both system ic problems and the challenges 
facing individual countries.”
I. 3 . THE IM F 'S  FIRST W O RLD EC O NO M IC OUTLOOK (WEO) 
(W D W /1 1 /9 3  5 M A Y  1 9 9 3 )
The advance copy of the first W EO , as usual, w as released to  the press, on April 
2 6 , before the Fund-Bank Spring m eetings. H ow ever, unusual and illustrative of these  
abnormally uncertain tim es is th a t the grow th  projections, already revised in an 
extraordinary "interim assessm ent" (W D W /7 /9 3 ) released only last January, have been 
revised again. These new ly revised, m edium -term  baseline projections and alternative  
scenarios will be included in the W E O 's final version, to  be released by the end of this 
month.
The first W EO 's advance copy contains the following chapters: I) overview ; II) 
world econom ic situation and short-term  prospects; III) policies for stronger noninflationary 
grow th in industrial countries; IV) convergence and divergence in developing countries; V) 




The recovery of global economic activity "remains hesitant and uneven," because 
"encouraging signs of stronger grow th in North Am erica contrast w ith  the recent marked  
deterioration in economic performance in Japan and especially in Europe, where  
recessionary tendencies are expected to  persist through 1 9 9 3 ."  The good new s is that 
"inflation has continued to abate in most industrial and developing countries."
The grow th of world output exhibited "the third consecutive year of below-trend  
perform ance," since it "picked up only m odestly, from 1 /2  to  1 percent in 1991 to  1 3 /4  
percent in 1 9 9 2 ."  The projections for 1 9 9 3  are th a t world output will grow by 2 1 /4  
percent and that it will strengthen by 3 1 /2  percent in 1 9 9 3 . Still, for Japan "grow th in 
1 9 9 3  has been revised dow n to 1 1 /4  percent," from 2 1 /2  percent in January 1 9 9 3  and 
from  3 3 /4  percent in October 1 9 9 2 . In Europe the slow dow n is even sharper, w ith  the  
revised projections revealing "stagnation in 1 9 9 3 ,"  by contrast w ith  grow th of 1 percent 
projected in January 1 9 9 3  and 2 1 /4  percent in October 1 9 9 2 . Thus, the projections of the  
last W EO for Japan and Europe have been drastically revised dow nw ards.
By contrast, "many developing countries have continued to show resilience to  the  
weakness of activity in industrial countries." H ow ever, among m any of the poorest 
countries "economic performance has remained unsatisfactory, and living standards are 
continuing to decline," particularly in A frica. In the developing countries "output is 
expected to expand by 5 percent in 1 9 9 3  and 1 9 9 4 , only slightly less than in 1 9 9 2 ."
Some of the reasons for this resilience among developing countries are found in 
"low interest rates on dollar-denominated external liabilities, and considerable capital 
inflow s in some cases, have helped to offset the effects  of declining term s of trade for 
com m odity exporters and of generally w eak demand in the industrial countries." Even so, 
"the m ost im portant reason," to explain the "com paratively strong perform ance of a 
growing number of developing countries," is found in "the beneficial e ffects  of sustained  
stabilization and reform efforts in the context of outward-oriented econom ic strategies."
For the developing countries as a whole the m edium -term  prospects are 
"encouraging perhaps more so than they have been in decades." Based on the assumption  
of continued efforts to  achieve m acroeconomic stability and the reduction of w hat are 
characterized as "structural distortions," output in the developing countries "is projected to 
grow at an average of 5 3 /4  percent in 1 9 9 5 -9 8 ."  A lternatively, a "policy-slippage 
scenario" for the same period reveals that average inflation would be "about 3 0  percentage 
points higher than in the baseline case, w ith  a particular rise in the W estern  Hemisphere 
and in the most heavily indebted countries."
Among the developing countries of the W estern  Hem isphere, "major reform s in the  
areas of trade, foreign investm ent, and financial and labor m arkets, together w ith  the  
declining debt overhang, are projected to  boost grow th m arkedly in the medium term ."
Betw een 1 9 9 5 -9 8 , real GDP in the developing countries of the W estern  Hemisphere  
is projected to grow at an annual average of 4 .8  percent and an investm ent ratio of almost 
25  percent. This medium term  outlook for the W estern Hemisphere developing economies  
"depends crucially on the assumption that the region continues to  ensure m acroeconom ic  
stability and to  sustain the m om entum  of reform s." Still, these figures contrast w ith  the
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projected grow th rates for Asia, during the same period, at 7 percent grow th in real GDP  
and an investm ent ratio of 3 0 .9  percent.
For the form er centrally planned economies, now  described as countries in 
transition, "the economic situation also remains difficult." H ow ever, some of the countries 
of central Europe, such as the form er Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, "output has 
begun to  recover, and inflationary pressures have been relatively contained." In the Baltic 
countries, as w ell, "there are encouraging signs th a t reform s are taking hold and are being 
supported by strong stabilization efforts ." By contrast, in m ost of the countries of the  
form er Soviet Union, "inadequate stabilization efforts now threaten to  lead to  
hyperinflation, which could derail the reform  process."
Finally, on trade policy, the early and successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round is 
essential to "reverse the rise in protectionist barriers," as w ell as it is "a central elem ent of 
any cooperative effort to strengthen grow th w orldw ide." Several recent studies "suggest 
that completing even the partial liberalization now envisaged would raise annual world real 
income perm anently by $ 1 2 0  to $ 2 0 0  billion."
I. 4. T H E  T O K Y O  S U M M IT
(W D W / 2 0 / 9 3  1 4  J U L Y  1 9 9 3 )
President Clinton achieved a remarkable success at his debut in sum m itry, 
particularly because of some of the circum stances which preceded his arrival in Tokyo, of 
all places. The President w as  preceded by his first five months plagued by frequent 
stumbling, an adverse press and by declining rates of approval, as well as a budgetary 
package just narrowly approved by both houses of Congress. Additionally, as remarked by 
experienced observers, such as Brent S cow croft and Lawrence Eagleburger, former 
National Security Adviser and Secretary of S tate , respectively, in the Bush Adm inistration, 
each of the sum m it participants appeared "so politically w eak  th a t parochial pressures from  
home threaten to  undermine any achievem ent at all." Finally, both Europe and Japan w ere  
seen as bogged dow n in recession, to  the point that no major breakthroughs were  
expected even in crucial m atters such as the Uruguay Round.
Given these initial apprehensions, it w as remarkable how  the President and his team  
w ere able to  turn around these allegedly unfavorable circum stances into the positive 
reasons later invoked to  explain the success achieved by the sum m it.
First of all, the narrow ly approved budgetary package gave the President an 
advantage, because as he warned on his w a y  to  Tokyo, it w as the other partners' turn to  
respond by lowering trade barriers and reactivating their economies. Even if these  
m easures did not im m ediately fo llow , the truth is that President Clinton appeared more 
credible than his predecessors.
Second, the relative w eakness of the other participants in e ffec t enhanced President 
Clinton's role. For instance, Prime M inister M iyazaw a 's  political difficulties, at tim es, left
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enough room for President Clinton to  play even the host's role. Consequently, the other 
participants w eakness, by contrast, enhanced President Clinton's relatively secure position.
Finally, the early announcem ent of a "breakthrough" on the issue of m arket access 
in the Uruguay Round negotiations dispelled some of the bleakness prognosticated by 
skeptical observers. As expressed by G A TT 's  new  Director General Peter Sutherland, if no 
accord w as reached in Tokyo, "the whole multilateral process...developed since 1 9 4 7  is 
endangered."
The outcome can be also credited to  the art of skillful "packaging," carried out 
under the stewardship of the ubiquitous new  counselor of President Clinton, David Gergen. 
Paraphrasing McLuhan, upon reading both the political and the economic declarations, it 
can be said that "the packaging is the message."
The political declaration gave strong support to  the United Nations and to  regional 
organizations; to the protection of human rights and to  the reforms in the "form er 
centralized economies;" to  the com bat against the proliferation of w eapons of mass 
destruction, singling out North Korea. Also, the Seven com m ented on the situation in 
Yugoslavia, Cambodia, the Middle East, Haiti, they also warned Iraq, Libya and Iran and 
they finally welcom ed the "progress tow ard  nonracial dem ocracy in South A frica."
H ow ever, as anticipated by Secretary of the Treasury Lloyd Bentsen, on July 1st., 
the "pleasant surprise" about the Tokyo Sum m it w as that "economics is actually at the top  
of the agenda. " As characterized by Secretary Bentsen, "w h at impressed me about this 
Economic Sum m it is that w e acted on issues like jobs that have a direct e ffec t on 
pocketbooks." Or on w hat he called "pocketbook economics--jobs, grow th and trade."
In his closing press conference. President Clinton agreed, saying th a t "some have 
called this a jobs sum m it, and they are right, because the creation of new  jobs in the  
United S tates and in all the other countries here present w as at the center of all our 
discussions." As explained by the President, "all of the advanced nations are having 
difficulty creating new jobs, even w hen their economies are growing."
Among the accomplishments contained in the economic declaration President 
Clinton mentioned first, the agreem ent to  open m anufacturing m arkets, which "could bring 
the largest reduction in tariffs  in world history." Second, there w as also agreem ent that 
"the other industrialized nations will send their top education, labor and economic ministers 
to W ashington in the fall for a serious conference on the creation of jobs." Third, a $3  
billion program w as approved "to help Russia move to  a m arket system ." The economic 
declaration also mentioned the environment and the developing countries, particularly the  
poorest countries in A frica, w hich "deserve special attention."
Finally, at the last m inute, President Clinton and the Prime M inister M iyazaw a  
announced an agreem ent on "a fram ew ork for a new  economic partnership," or w h at the  
W ashington Post called "an agreem ent on how to approach an agreem ent." H ow ever, this 
should not be belittled, because the fram ew ork w as agreed w ith  a Prime M inister that had 
been w ritten  off as a lame duck.
1 0
President Clinton summarized the results as follows: "I cam e to  this sum m it in the  
hope th a t w e  could get an agreem ent to  open more m arkets to  m anufactured products, in 
the hope th a t w e  could get a strong program for Russian aid, in the hope th a t together w e  
could dem onstrate resolve to  restore the ability of all our countries to  create jobs and 
opportunities for our people. I believe those objectives w ere  achieved and I am pleased at 
the first of these G -7 meetings which I w as  able to  attend."
I. 5. THE IM F 'S  SECOND W ORLD ECO NO M IC OUTLOOK (WEO) 
(W D W /2 6 /9 3  2 9  SEPTEMBER 1 9 9 3 )
It is a sign of the uncertainties th a t characterize the short-term  prospects of the  
world econom y that the IM F has revised, for the third tim e this year, the output projections 
for most industrial countries (W D W /7 ,1 1 /9 3 ). The reasons offered to account for these  
revisions are th a t "in Japan, recent indicators suggest th a t the recovery stalled in the  
spring; recovery in continental w estern  Europe appears unlikely to  begin until late this year 
or early in 1 9 9 4 ; and in North Am erica the expansions are som ew hat w eaker than  
expected."
These new ly revised m edium -term  projections appear as Annex III of the second 
W EO , released by the IMF s ta ff on Septem ber 2 2 , just before the annual Bank-Fund 
m eetings. Consequently, instead of the 1 .7  percent in output grow th for 1 9 9 3  and almost 
3 percent for 1 9 9 4 , projected last April for the industrial countries, the revised projections 
are 1.1 percent for this year and 2 .2  percent for 1 9 9 4 .
How ever, this "w eaker-than-expected  activ ity  in the industrial countries is o ffset by 
stronger grow th in the developing countries," projected at 6.1 percent in 1 9 9 3  and 5 .5  
percent in 1 9 9 4 . This "strong grow th  in m any developing countries remains the most 
positive feature of the global situation."
In all, world output is expected to  grow by 2 .2  and 3 .2  percent in 1 9 9 3  and 1 9 9 4 , 
respectively. Thus, 1 9 9 3  "marks the fourth consecutive year of sub-par grow th  
perform ance for the world econom y."
The technical assumptions for the industrial countries' projections include 
"unchanged fiscal policy, except for m easures already announced and likely to be 
im plem ented; unchanged m onetary policy (generally interpreted as nonaccom odating, w ith  
short-term  interest rates moving in response to  changes in inflationary pressures and 
cyclical conditions); constant real e ffective  exchange rates . . .; and specific assumptions 
about com m odity and oil prices."
T w o  scenarios are projected for the developing countries. "The baseline scenario  
assumes that the economic policies underlying IMF-supported adjustm ent and reform  
programs will be fu lly im plem ented." This "optim istic assumption" is tem pered, "in v iew  of 
earlier experiences," by the introduction of "an alternative scenario . . . th a t illustrates the  
implications of possible policy slippages."
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Besides the assumption that the developing countries will continue implementing  
reform s, "exchange rates are assumed to  remain unchanged in real term s." W hile nonfuel 
com m odity prices "are assumed to  increase by 4  1 /4  percent a year in 1 9 9 5 -9 8 ."  Finally, 
"total financing flow s to  the net debtor developing countries are expected to  increase in 
the m edium -term  (compared w ith  1 9 8 3 -9 2 ) as recently resumed commercial bank lending 
continues (particularly to several Latin Am erican countries) and as flight capital continues 
to return."
On the basis of these assumptions, in the W estern Hemisphere, "GDP grow th is 
projected to  rise to  about 4  1 /2  percent a year in the medium term , from  2 percent a year 
in 1 9 8 3 -9 2 . This would imply annual per capita grow th of nearly 2 1 /2  percent, compared  
w ith  no grow th in 1 9 8 3 -9 2 ."  In the short-term , "increases in output in the developing  
countries of the W estern Hemisphere are expected to  average 3 1 /2  percent in 1 9 9 3 -9 4 ."
The prospects for w hat are called "countries in transition” are positively 
characterized, since "several central European countries appear to  have started the process 
of recovery, but high inflation and excessive budget deficits threaten to  prolong the crisis 
in m ost countries of the form er Soviet Union."
On the bright side, "for most of the industrial countries, inflation remains one of the 
most positive features of the current situation." Among the developing countries of the 
W estern  Hemisphere, inflation is expected to remain under the average projected for all the  
developing countries, of 4 2  3 /4  percent in 1 9 9 3  and of 3 4  3 /4  percent in 1 9 9 4 . "Excluding 
Brazil, inflation in the region is expected to  moderate from 2 3  percent in 1 9 9 2  to  16  
percent in 1 9 9 3 , and to 11 1 /2  percent in 1 9 9 4 ."
Average nonfuel com m odity prices are expected to continue falling by 2 1 /2  percent 
in 1 9 9 3 , as a result of several pressures, such as w eak overall demand in the industrial 
countries, mounting stocks and difficulties w ith  international price support agreem ents, as 
in the case of beverages. Prices of m etals have also declined because of w eak  demand and 
continued exports from the form er Soviet Union. In 1 9 9 3 , average petroleum prices are 
expected to  fall to $1 6 .6 8  and to  increase to $ 1 7 .2 3  in 1 9 9 4 .
The advanced copy of the second W EO w as released in tw o  volumes. The first 
volume contains the following chapters: I) overview; II) world economic situation and 
short-term  prospects; III) recent changes in the European Exchange Rate M echanism ; IV) 
the critical need for fiscal adjustm ent and labor m arket reform in industrial countries; V) 
dom estic and foreign saving in developing countries; V I) stabilization and enterprise reform  
in the countries in transition. The second volume contains the boxes, a statistical appendix 
and the following annexes: I) structural budget indicators for the major industrial countries;
II) econom ic benefits of reducing military expenditures; and III) medium term  projections.
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I. 6 . THE APEC MEETING
(W D W /3 5 /9 3  1 DECEMBER 1 9 9 3 )
Arm ed w ith  the solid victory of the NAFTA approval (W D W /3 4 /9 3 ) , President 
Clinton w en t im m ediately afterw ards to  the m eeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum . The purpose w as , according to  Secretary o f S tate  W arren  
Christopher, to  accomplish the second out of a "triple p lay,” w hich would hopefully 
conclude in Geneva w ith  the completion on deadline of the Uruguay Round negotiations.
This "second out," w as as am bitious, if not more, than the other tw o . As reminded 
by Nicholas Eberstadt from the Am erican Enterprise Institute (AEI), in The W ashington  
T im es , the challenges in the Pacific Rim "are more political than econom ic." In Eberstadt 
term s, "four great political questions loom over the Asia and Pacific region today."
First, the "most pressing" issue remains how the division of the Korean peninsula 
will be resolved. Second, Japan, as the second largest econom y in the w orld, "cannot 
forever remain a one-legged giant," to ta lly  dependent from the United S tates for its 
security. Third, the future of China's transition and the em ergence of w h a t the W orld Bank 
describes as "a fourth grow th pole" (W D W /1 6 /9 3 ) . Finally, the question remains if the  
United S tates will turn inwards, refusing to  exercise the role of leader and arbiter that 
decisively influences the stability of the Pacific Rim.
W ith  these issues looming in the background, both meetings of the ministers and of 
the leaders of APEC, held in Seattle on the 1 7 -2 0  Novem ber, w ere no minor 
accom plishm ents.
As revealed in the joint s tatem ent issued by the ministers, at the conclusion of their 
meeting on Novem ber 1 7 -1 9 , the range of topics w as impressive: 1) the report proposing a 
vision, by the Eminent Persons Group (EPG); 2) economic trends and issues; 3) trade and 
investm ent issues; 4) the APEC w ork program; 5) participation issues; and 6) 
organizational issues.
The report of the Eminent Persons Group w as presented by the chairm an, C. Fred 
Bergsten, from the well know n, W ashington-based think tank. Institute of International 
Economics (HE). It offers "a vision for APEC," consisting of a "four-part program," aimed at 
the creation of "a true Asia Pacific Economic Com m unity." The first com ponent of the 
proposal is "to declare an ultim ate goal of free trade for the Asia Pacific region." W ithout, 
how ever, suggesting a "target date," only mentioning that such date would be set by 
1 9 9 6 . Second, to  "launch an im m ediate trade facilitation program." Third, to  "initiate an 
extensive program of technical cooperation." Fourth, "to begin a process of m odest 
institutional developm ent," by creating "a perm anent Secretariat w ith  a director general at 
ministerial level."
The Ministers "w arm ly w elcom ed the Report's broad thrust and direction," and 
"instructed senior officials to develop pragm atic programs to im plem ent the EPG 
recom m endations. "
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This m odest outcom e revealed the basic divisions th a t persist among the  
heterogeneous m em bers about APEC's future. Some would like to  m ove quickly, such as 
Australia, Singapore and South Korea. In the term s of the Foreign M inister of South Korea, 
Hang Sung Joo, the "aim is to  bring the Eastern Pacific and the W estern  Pacific together, 
to  get Am erica more com m itted to Asia, and to  get Asia together."
Not so fast, says the group of m em ber countries of the Association of South-East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), w ith  the support of Japan. These mem bers do not disagree openly 
w ith  the ultim ate goals, as described by David Sanger in The N ew  York T im es , "as long as 
they are kept in the sufficiently distant future."
Finally, there is one dissident, absent from Seattle and described by The Journal of 
Com m erce as "the specter at the feast." It w as the Prime Minister of M alaysia, M ahatir 
M oham ad w ho favors the creation of an East Asia Economic Caucus th a t pointedly 
excludes the United States and Australasia.
On other topics, the Ministers agreed to "initiate regular exchange among APEC 
m embers of key economic statistics." On trade and investm ent, the Ministers adopted a 
fram ew ork and a w ork program. Also, a post-Uruguay Round ministerial m eeting w as  
decided and the w ork program for the functioning of the ten working groups th a t exist 
w ithin APEC.
Probably the most significant departure consisted in the admission of M exico and 
Papua N ew  Guinea to APEC, while Chile's admission w as postponed until the ministerial 
meeting of 1 9 9 4 . Also, the Ministers "agreed to  defer consideration of additional members 
for three years." Finally, the "successful establishm ent" of APEC's Secretariat w as noted 
w ith  satisfaction and a Central Fund of $2 million w as  also approved.
The meeting of leaders, so-called to  avoid using the term  heads of sta te , issued a 
"vision statem ent." They supported the completion of the Uruguay Round on Decem ber 15  
and envisioned a com m unity among the APEC m em bers. The leaders also w elcom ed the  
challenge of achieving free trade in the region, w ithout setting a deadline; they agreed to  
convene a meeting of APEC finance ministers; the establishm ent of a business forum; and 
of an education program.
Summarizing the outcome of the whole event, "an unidentified official," w as quoted 
in The W ashington Tim es saying that it is still "premature to  see APEC as an embryo body 
th a t m ight lead to tariff cuts among its mem bers."
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II. THE U.S. ECONOMY
II. 1 PRESIDENT BUSH'S ECO NO M IC VALEDICTO RY  
(W D W /3 /9 3  3  FEBRUARY 1 9 9 3 )
This year's Economic Report of the President w as the last presented by the Bush 
Adm inistration to the U .S. Congress. Issued just a fe w  w eeks before the inauguration of 
President Clinton, the Report surveys the accom plishm ent and shortcomings of the  
econom ic policies applied during the last four years.
In the letter of transmission to  the Congress, President Bush attem pts to  draw  a 
balance on the economic performance of the last four years. Some accom plishm ents, such 
as low inflation and interest rates are highlighted, as well as the 1 9 9 0 -9 1  recession, 
characterized as "relatively short (8 m onths compared to a postw ar average of 11 ),"  while  
the subsequent recovery is described as "quite slow by historical standards."
The annual report of the Council is divided in the following chapters: 1) perspectives  
on the econom y and economic policy; 2) recent developm ents and the econom ic outlook;
3) m onetary and fiscal policy in the current environment; 4 ) the econom ics of health care; 
5) m arkets and regulatory reform; 6) econom ic grow th and future generations; 7) w hither 
international trade and finance?
The interpretation offered by the Council of Economic Advisers of these and other 
events of the last four years is still of interest, given the decisive role allegedly played by 
the perform ance of the econom y in the outcom e of the elections. Here is a sum m ary of 
some of the highlights contained in these chapters.
The Report begins arguing against tw o  current interpretations generated by the  
slow dow n in the U .S . econom y. First, the "declinists," w ho hold that the U .S . econom y is 
in decline, are criticized because their "com plaints cannot survive a thorough scrutiny 
based on readily available factual inform ation and sound economic analysis." Second, 
against the "revisionists," w ho blame the economic policies practiced during the last 
tw e lve  years for the present predicam ent, the Report asserts th a t "on balance, economic 
policy since 1 9 8 0  has been much superior to that of the late 19 6 0 s  and the 19 7 0 s ."
By contrast, the Report holds responsible several structural imbalances and 
adjustm ents for the sluggish perform ance of the econom y. For instance, "shifting  
demographic trends" explain the reduced demand for new  housing and durable goods.
Also, the end of the Cold W ar transform ed defense spending from "a large net stimulus for 
the econom y to being a sizable drag," amounting to  a "negative e ffec t of nearly 0 .4  
percentage point on the grow th  rate of real GDP."
In the financial sector, constraints on credit resulted in a "credit crunch," which  
together w ith  the overbuilding of com m ercial real state and high levels of consumer and 
corporate debt, constrained both private investm ent and consumption.
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Finally, the short-term relationships betw een m oney--as measured by M 2--and  
nominal GDP have not been as stable as in the past. Specifically, during 1 9 9 2 , "nominal 
GDP grew  at a rate of around 5 percent, while the M 2  m onetary aggregate grew  a t a much 
low er ra te -less  than 2 112 percent-dem onstrating that the relationship betw een the  
grow th of m oney and credit and the grow th of the econom y had changed during this 
period." This changing relationship betw een M 2  and economic activ ity  m ade it "harder to  
judge the extent to  which current m onetary policy is stimulating or restraining the 
econom y."
Still, the soft-landing strategy adopted by the Federal Reserve, although it "failed to  
avert a recession as a result of unexpected events," is characterized as "highly successful 
in reestablishing progress tow ard lower inflation."
The outlook is m oderately optim istic, w ith  real GDP predicted to grow  about 3 
percent in 1 9 9 3  and expected to  remain w ithin this 3-percent range through the mid- 
1990s .
To conclude, the last chapter of the Report surveys several aspects of international 
trade and finance. On the evolution of exchange rate arrangem ents, the em ergence of 
regional currency blocs is anticipated, built around the dollar, the single European currency  
and the yen.
The changing role of the International M onetary Fund (IMF) is also exam ined, 
particularly the shift in its role from provider of financing for the industrialized countries to  
provider of "technical assistance and recurrent financing to the developing countries, 
bringing its activities close to those of the World Bank."
The North Am erican Free Trade Agreem ent (NAFTA) is summarized and positively 
described, as part of a process of regional integration seen as com plem entary to  the  
overriding objective of expanding open and transparent trade w orldw ide. In this same 
sense, regional integration, such as the creation of a Hem ispheric-w ide free trade area from  
Alaska to Argentina and the completion of the Uruguay Round are seen as com plem entary.
Finally, a trade policy agenda for the future describes several im portant trade issues 
w hich will have to be confronted in the "not-too-distant future." These include the  
relationship betw een trade and com petition policy, to  make the latter more com patible and 
enforceable across borders; a code of conduct to  regulate governm ent support of high- 
technology industries; and the clarification of the linkage betw een trade and the  
environm ent, w ith  the purpose of ameliorating environmental problems w ithout 
unnecessary disruptions of trade relations.
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II. 2 . PRESIDENT C LIN TO N 'S  ECO NO M IC PACKAGE 
(W D W /6 /9 3  3 M ARCH 1 9 9 3 )
In w h at w as alm ost unanimously recognized as a m asterful delivery, last 
W ednesday, President Clinton presented to  a joint session of Congress the package 
addressing the issue which granted him the victory at the polls last Novem ber.
As described in A Vision of Change for A m erica , the budget docum ent presented to  
the Congress, "the over-arching them e of the Clinton Adm inistration's econom ic plan is 
increasing public and private investm ent." This objective will be pursued by m eans of three  
basic elem ents: stimulus, investm ent and defic it reduction.
The stimulus com ponent seeks "to ensure th a t recovery from recession is strong 
and durable." It contains a com bination of $ 3 0  billion in outlays and tax  incentives which  
together will create almost 5 0 0 ,0 0 0  new  jobs by the end of 1 9 9 4 .
The investm ent com ponent increases spending in infrastructure, in enhancing the  
skills of workers, in the developm ent and use of science and technology and in the delivery 
of health care, while increasing also tax  incentives for business. In all, betw een 1 9 9 4  and 
1 9 9 7 , the stimulus and investm ent com ponent amounts to  $ 1 6 9  billion.
Finally, the deficit reduction com ponent contains w h at are characterized as the  
"difficult and unglamorous steps," aim ed a t cuts in ongoing spending as w ell as selected  
tax  increases, amounting to  slightly less than one-half of 1 percent of GDP per year over 
four years.
The largest cuts are in defense discretionary outlays, amounting to  $ 7 6  billion, out 
of a total reduction of $ 2 4 7  billion betw een  1 9 9 4  and 1 9 9 7 . Revenue increases will 
basically com e from raising taxes on the w ealth iest and on corporations, as w ell as from  
the introduction of a broad-based energy tax , projected to  generate alm ost $ 2 4 6  billion 
betw een 1 9 9 4  and 1 9 9 7 .
The assumptions about future changes in the key economic variab les -g row th , 
inflation, unem ploym ent and interest rates--are said to  avoid "rosy scenarios" and 
"gim m icks." First, the recovery from the recent recession is projected at "well below the  
historical average, w ith  real annual econom ic grow th peaking at 3 percent," slowing  
gradually to  around 2 percent a year. Unem ploym ent is projected to  reach "the minimum  
level consistent w ith  low inflation--about 5 .5  percent unem ploym ent-shortly  a fter the end 
of the five-year forecast period." Due in part to  the m odest rate of econom ic grow th, 
inflation is projected to decline, w ith  consum er prices increasing in the long run by 2 .7  
percent a year, while the GDP implicit deflator is expected to  increase by only 2 .2  percent 
in the long-run. M odest econom ic grow th  and low inflation are expected to  bring long-term  
interest rates dow n, although short-term  interest rates are projected to  increase by a full 
percentage point.
In President Clinton's term s, the spending cuts and the tax  increases w ere  
necessary to  "accomplish both increased investm ent and defic it reduction, something--he  
added--no Am erican governm ent has ever been called upon to  do at the same tim e before."
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This goal required setting aside some campaign promises, particularly the pledge to  cut 
taxes on the middle class, replaced by a new  tax  on energy.
According to  The N ew  York T im es, on this issue. President Clinton's economic team  
split in tw o  camps. On one side, budget director Leon Panetta and his deputy Alice Rivlin, 
supported by Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen, w ere "the deficit haw ks," or the "pain-is- 
good" faction, favoring higher taxes. On the other side, the chairperson of the Council of 
Economic Advisers Laura D 'Andrea Tyson, Labor Secretary Robert Reich and Com m erce  
Secretary Ronald Brown w ere in favor of stimulating the econom y and creating jobs.
Three "vital audiences," said The W ashington Post, w ere  kept in mind by the  
decision-makers: the public, the Congress and the financial m arkets. The public's 
im m ediate reaction w as positive. T w o  national polls released over the w eekend found  
ample majorities in support of the President. By contrast, the day before the speech, the  
m arkets blinked by taking a nose dive, although later in the w eek  the impression w as that 
business w as divided about the plan. M eanw hile, long-term interest rates appeared  
supportive by reaching the low est point since the 1 9 7 3  oil embargo.
Additionally, strong support cam e from the Federal Reserve Chairman Alan  
Greenspan--who W ednesday night, "Clintonologists" rem arked, w as symbolically seated at 
the First Lady's left hand side. Mr. Greenspan said he w as "quite pleased" that deficit 
reduction "is on the table and is going to get resolved."
How ever, the key rests in Congress. On the Republican side, Senator Robert Dole of 
Kansas led the opposition noting that the plan did not live to the pledge of $2  in spending 
cuts for every $1 in new taxes, which unleashed w hat w as characterized as a "battle of 
the calculators." President Clinton anticipated this criticism by challenging "those w ho  say 
w e should cut more be as specific as I have been." Even so, the most critical concerns 
w ere coming from some fellow -Dem ocrats, particularly because they raised the possibility 
of untying the package. As expressed by Senator David Boren of Oklahom a, "a lot of us 
will be extrem ely uncom fortable w ith  voting more money for anything before w e  lock in 
deficit reduction." Also, the powerful chairman of the Senate Arm ed Services Com m ittee, 
Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia warned that the $ 7 6  billion reduction in m ilitary spending "is 
certainly more than I recom m end." Finally, some farm -state legislators are worried about 
deep cuts in agricultural subsidies. The W hite House, how ever, stuck to  the preference  
that the plan be approved as a package.
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III. U.S.-JAPAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
III. 1. NEG O TIATING  THE U .S . JAPAN FRAM EW ORK FOR A NEW  ECONOM IC  
PARTNERSHIP
(W D W /2 1 /9 3  21 JULY 1 9 9 3 )
One of the outstanding outcom es of the last Tokyo Sum m it (W D W /2 0 /9 3 ) w as  the  
announcem ent by Prime M inister M iyazaw a and President Clinton, only three hours before 
his scheduled departure for Korea, th a t they had agreed on a new  "fram ew ork" for 
discussing their trade tensions.
This new  fram ew ork is the successor of w hat w ere known as the Structural 
Im pedim ents Initiative (Sll) talks, w hich w ere launched in July 1 9 8 9 , to  focus on the  
"structural obstacles" held responsible by both the United S tates and Japan for the  
obstinate trade imbalance w hich prevails among them .
Proof of the problem's persistence can be found in the approval of the new  
fram ew ork and in President Clinton's s tatem ent that there should be "no illusions." He 
said, "w e announce today a fram ew ork to govern specific agreem ents yet to  be 
negotiated." As described in the afternoon edition of the Nihon Keizai Shim bun. Japan's  
respected financial daily quoted in The W ashington Post, the agreem ent w as  like 
Tam am ushi. "an insect that appears to  change colors w hen view ed from different angles."
H ow ever, the agreem ent should not be prem aturely belittled. In the term s of The 
W all S treet Journal, it is a rem arkable accom plishm ent "pitting the final w ishes of a 
politically humiliated Japanese prime minister against the ambitions of a novice U .S. 
president."
Even more so, because the preliminary conversations had failed on June 2 8 , when  
the U .S . negotiating team  had to return home em pty handed. W hat brought the parties 
back to  the negotiating table w as a letter from Prime Minister M iyazaw a to  President 
Clinton, sent over the July 4  w eekend, urging the President to  try  again and asking the  
U .S . negotiators to return to the negotiating table.
The same message w as presented in W ashington by the Japanese Ambassador 
Takakazu Kuriyama to Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen, Secretary of S tate  W arren  
Christopher and National Economic Council Chairman Robert Rubin. This personal request 
from the host of the forthcoming G -7 sum m it bypassed the opposition from  the powerful 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (M IT I) and from the Ministry of Finance.
The issue around which the initial conversations broke down w as the demand by 
the U .S . that a target, or a benchm ark, should be set to  reduce by half the Japanese trade  
surplus, from  3 percent of GDP to  1 .5  percent. The Japanese negotiators dismissed this 
proposition as an attem pt a t "m anaged trade," or interference w ith  the free play of m arket 
forces. A lso, behind the Japanese resistance to  targets w as the fear they could be used
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as triggers for unilateral retaliation. The outcome reveals how much each side moved  
aw ay  from their original proposals, by adopting a te x t w hich could be interpreted by each  
of them  as giving credit to  their respective positions, or w h at w as  characterized as the  
"Tam am ushi factor."
First of all, the United S tates accepted th a t the agreem ent should not include 
numerical targets. In exchange, the Japanese delegation agreed to  im plem ent policies to  
achieve a "highly significant decrease in its current account surplus," as well as "a 
significant increase in global imports of goods and services, including from  the United  
States." Additionally, the Japanese delegation accepted the use of "sets of objective  
criteria, either qualitative or quantitative or both," to  evaluate progress in the following five 
areas: governm ent procurement, regulatory reform and com petitiveness, autom obiles and 
parts, economic harmonization of foreign direct investm ent regulations, and the  
im plem entation of existing arrangem ents and measures.
On the basis of this mutual accom m odation, each side could claim th a t its own  
interpretation prevailed. For instance. President Clinton said, "now  at least w e  agree on 
w h at the outcome of these negotiations needs to be: tangible, measurable progress." By 
contrast, the chairman of the powerful business association Keidanren, M r. Gaishi H iraiw a, 
praised the accord for not including numerical targets. Also, Prime M inister M iyazaw a  
stressed the importance of a clause specifying th a t "consultations will be limited to  m atters  
within the scope and responsibility of governm ent," which m ay become an escape clause, 
in case the Japanese private sector refuses to cooperate.
Finally, the United S tates did not give up the imposition of Section 301 sanctions in 
case on non-compliance. H ow ever, according to Japanese officials quoted in The N ew  
York T im es , "in a side letter to  the agreem ent that has not been made public, Japan says it 
reserves the right to drop out of any negotiations if faced w ith  a threat of sanctions."
Probably the bottom line was better described by "a senior Adm inistration official," 
quoted in The N ew  York T im es, saying the agreem ent "establishes the rules of the gam e," 
but "the game is still to  be played." Be it as it m ay, the sole fac t that there w as  
agreem ent w as a remarkable outcom e, considering that the Japanese Prime M inister w as  
afflicted by w h at The W ashington Post described as a severe case of "lam educkhood."
In recognition. President Clinton closed the press conference announcing the  
agreem ent, as described in The W all Street Journal, "by ad libbing an effusive tribute to  
the prime minister." President Clinton said, "he has shown w isdom , determ ination and 
genuine leadership...! do not believe that this day would have com e to pass had it not been 
for Prime Minister M iyazaw a."
III. 2 . IM PLEM ENTING THE U .S .- JAPAN ECONOM IC FRAMEW ORK  
(W D W /3 1 /9 3  3 NOVEMBER 1 9 9 3 )
It is becoming increasingly evident that the new  fram ew ork to  deal w ith  the  
obstinate trade imbalance that persists betw een the United States and Japan, announced
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at the last m inute of the Tokyo sum m it (W D W /2 0 /9 3 ) , represents a significant departure. 
Even if it is still too early to  judge if the new  fram ew ork will generate the expected results, 
the initial negotiations (W D W /2 1 /9 3 ) and the first m eetings already reveal a profound 
change of objectives and of tactics.
According to  Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, Deputy U .S . Trade Representative 
for Asia and the Pacific, this tim e the negotiation is "results-oriented." This m eans th a t 
"process and procedural change is not enough unless it leads to  concrete change in the  
m arketplace." To measure the results, "objective indicators, both quantitative and 
qualitative," will be used in term s of "tangible progress tow ard m arket access and sales."
This emphasis on results has been interpreted as a victory for the so-called 
"revisionists." They assert that Japan practices a different kind of capitalism and th a t trade  
relations cannot be spontaneous, they have to  be managed. Thus, the previously dominant 
paradigm, represented by the so-called "Chrysanthem um  Club" has been overthrow n. As  
described by Ian Buruma, the Chrysanthem um s hoped that "the Japanese given some 
patience, would be one day just like" the United S tates. As evidence of the demise of the  
dom inant paradigm, in the victorious ranks of the revisionists appear some prominent 
m em bers of the Clinton Adm inistration, such as Laura Tyson, the W hite House chief 
econom ic adviser, described in The W all S treet Journal as "chief revisionist." In Ms. 
Tyson's term s, Japan practices "a capitalism  that w asn 't like the capitalism I understood."
Consequently, negotiations to  accomplish results, "under a firm tim etab le ," are 
already under w ay  in the five "baskets" identified in the fram ew ork-governm ent 
procurem ent, autos and auto parts, regulatory reform and com petitiveness, economic  
harm onization, and im plem entation of existing arrangem ents and measures.
Some of the difficulties that appear in the governm ent procurem ent "basket" w ere  
described by Ambassador Barshefsky in a recent testim ony, to  the Subcom m ittees on Asia 
and the Pacific and Economic Policy and Trade of the U .S . House Com m ittee on Foreign 
Affairs.
For instance, in com puters, foreign m anufacturers have "41 percent of the private 
m arket in Japan," but they supply "less than one percent of the central Japanese  
governm ent m ainfram e m arket." In supercom puters, while U .S . m anufacturers "have 8 4  
percent of the installed base in the governm ent supercom puter m arket in Europe, they  
represent barely ten percent in Japan .” In telecom m unications, "the U .S . share of N TT 's  
to tal procurem ent has never exceeded seven percent," and while the "average foreign  
share of the private and public telecom m unications m arket in the industrialized world other 
than Japan is 2 5  p e rc e n t. . . the foreign share of the same m arket in Japan is only five  
percent."
This is only an exam ple of the sort of issues that are on the negotiating tab le, which  
reveals how  fixated on the persistent trade imbalance remains the tension betw een Japan  
and the United States. A dm itted ly, there are powerful reasons for this fixation. A fter all, as 
described by the new  President of the Federal Reserve Bank of N ew  York, W illiam J. 
M cDonough, for the past ten  years, "the U .S . has run, on average a $ 4 5  billion annual 
m erchandise trade deficit w ith  Japan." H ow ever, these trade "linkages," in President 
M cDonough's term s, also "have their financial counterparts, and each country has.
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particularly over the past decade, significantly increased its presence in the other's  
financial m arkets."
In a recent address to  the Japan Society of N ew  York, President McDonough  
presented some of these indicators of financial interdependence, w hich reveal the  
existence of other imbalances betw een Japan and the United S tates. For instance, 
"Japanese official institutions and private creditors . . . hold roughly 2 5  percent of all 
foreign-held U .S . governm ent debt." A lso, "in term s of foreign in v e s tm e n t. . . Japan, 
w hich had holdings of some $ 1 0 0  billion in the U .S . a t the end of 1 9 9 2 , has invested far 
more in the U .S . than the roughly $ 2 6  billion the U .S . has invested in Japan."
Concerning banking relationships, President McDonough recognized that "the 
presence of Japanese banks in the U .S . m arkets is far more dom inant than the presence of 
U.S. banks in Japan's m arkets." For exam ple, by the end of 1 9 9 2 , "Japanese bank 
branches, agencies, and subsidiaries in the U .S. accounted for about $ 1 0 0  billion in 
commercial and industrial loans, equivalent to  roughly 17 percent of all such loans and a 
dram atic increase from the 5 .5  percent share these institutions held in 1 9 8 5 ."  By contrast, 
"in aggregate, Japanese banks in the U .S. held some $ 4 0 0  billion in assets by the end of 
1 9 9 2  at the same tim e as U .S. banks in Japan held only about $ 7 0  billion in assets."
Having reviewed these multiple levels of trade and financial interdependence, the  
President of the N ew  York Fed concluded stating that "our common goals are so obvious 
w e simply cannot afford to allow our cooperation to  lapse or to  permit ourselves the luxury 
of tending single-mindedly to our own gardens."
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IV. THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
IV . 1. PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES  
(W D W /1 2 /9 3  12 M A Y  1 9 9 3 )
This is the third year in w hich the W orld Bank's Global Economic Prospects and the  
Developing Economies is released as part of the annual series draw n by the International 
Economics Departm ent from the analysis prepared for the forthcoming W orld Developm ent 
Report. The previous tw o  focused on specific issues, such as international trade in primary 
com m odities and in m anufactures. This year's  focuses on the role of external finance in 
developm ent and it contains three parts: I) The Financial Environment in the 1990s ; II)
Major Issues in International Finance in the 1990s ; and III) Developing-Country Prospects.
Despite a mixed outlook for the international economic environm ent during the next 
decade, as well as uncertainties about the recovery of the industrial econom ies, the  
prospects for the developing countries in w h a t remains of the 1 9 9 0 s  "hold out the promise 
of higher grow th rates." By contrast w ith  the 1 9 8 0 s , these relatively brighter prospects are 
"to a large extent the dividend of the wide-ranging --and often painful-- econom ic policy 
reform s of the past decade."
The grow th rate of developing countries for the next decade is projected to  increase 
at a yearly average of 4 .7  percent, or about 2 percent per capita, w hich contrasts w ith  the  
perform ance of the eighties at an average GDP grow th of 2 .7  percent per year w ith  
stagnant per capita GDP in real term s.
A  "downside scenario," based on a relatively more pessimistic set of assumptions, 
cuts in half the rate at which the per capita income of developing countries is projected to  
grow , to  about 1 .3  percent a year. This would represent an increase over the decade of 
about 8 0  million in the number o f absolute poor, as opposed to an equivalent decrease  
projected by the base case.
The international economic environm ent for the next ten years presents a mixed  
outlook, w ith  "both large problems and opportunities," which furnishes the key 
assumptions for the Bank's projections.
First, "economic activ ity  in the industrial countries has not only a poor short-term  
outlook but also an underlying trend of s low  grow th in productivity, w hich has prevailed 
since 1 9 7 3 . Second, "real interest rates (mainly long-term interest rates) are likely to  stay  
high because of a decline in public savings in industrial countries." Third, "world trade  
faces an uncertain future, pending com pletion of the Uruguay Round, but grow th in 
intraregional trade is likely." Fourth, "com m odity prices are expected to  stabilize in real 
term s--a sharp break from their tw en ty -year declining trend--partly because of the extent to  
w hich developing countries are shifting out of primary production." Fifth, "for creditw orthy  
developing countries, external finance is likely to  be in good supply from private sources, 
but countries w ithou t m arket access w ill face a limited or even shrinking aid pie."
23
In this context, there are differences among several developing regions. For 
instance, in Sub-Saharan Africa GDP grow th "is expected to  increase, but not at a rate  
much higher than population grow th." The outlook is characterized as "especially fragile 
since it is dependent upon the end of the decline of real com m odity prices."
By contrast, in the Middle East and North Africa grow th is projected a t betw een 4  
and 5 percent, the best performance since the 1 9 7 0 s , on account of the price of oil 
exports, expected to  rise in the second half of the decade.
South Asia is expected to grow at an average of around 5 percent, "w ith  faster 
grow th in the second half of the decade as reforms take hold in India, the region's 
dom inant econom y." Significant rates of annual grow th, of about 7 .3  percent, are 
expected to persist in East Asia, still a slower pace than the previous decade. H ow ever, 
w ithin this region the Bank foresees the em ergence of a "fourth grow th pole" of the world 
econom y, the so-called "Chinese economic area (CEA)" form ed by China, Hong-Kong and 
T aiw an . This em ergent "growth pole" is characterized by "large and growing economic 
mass, strongly affecting other economies; persistence of m edium -term  economic grow th in 
the face of shifting external circumstances; and high degree of sustainability of long-term  
grow th."
The recovery in Latin Am erica is expected to  continue w ith  GDP grow th of around 4  
percent a year considered "achievable over the long-run," on the condition that both 
"improved policies are sustained and external creditor confidence is m aintained, in the form  
of continuing foreign direct investm ent (FDD and portfolio inflow s." In the 1 9 9 0 s , the  
investm ent-to-G DP ratio "is expected to  rise by about 5 percentage points compared to  the  
depressed levels in the 1 9 8 0 s ,"  while the savings-to-GDP ratio is projected to  grow by 
more than 4  percent. Also, as a result of numerous privatization programs, "increased 
investm ent will come more from the private sector," although "public investm ent in 
infrastructure will still have to com plem ent private investm ent." On the downside, "in an 
extrem e case, it could be argued that there is the possibility of another external financing  
crisis" in Latin Am erica, "stemming from the volatility of some of the new er capital flow s."
Finally, although forecasts for Europe and Central Asia "are subject to  the greatest 
degree of uncertainty," the "structural reforms and the shift to m arket m echanisms are 
expected to pay dividends w ith  growth of about 2 percent per year in the 1 990s , 
recovering the sharp decline of recent years."
IV . 2 . THE FOURTH GROW TH POLE 
(W D W /1 6 /9 3  9 JUNE 1 993 )
It has become almost a habit, among some practitioners of "international political 
geom etry," to describe the world in term s of the em ergence of a neat partition in three  
distinctive blocs. Even the form er Prime Minister of Britain M argaret Thatcher, a t the  
Houston G-Seven Sum m it of July 1 9 9 0 , w as  quoted as saying, "there are three great 
groups of nations at the sum m it, one based on the dollar, one based on the yen, and one 
based on the Deutsche m ark."
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Perhaps there is a touch of nostalgia for the neatness of the by-gone bipolar world 
among those w ho see the world already divided in three blocs. A lso, this search for blocs 
m ay represent another m anifestation of w h a t is known as the "rooster syndrom e," which  
afflic ts  those w ho sing early to  m ake the sun rise earlier (W D W /1 4 /9 3 ). Because, despite 
repeated assertions, these three blocs are still nowhere to  be found, w ith  the tidiness that 
is already attributed to them .
For instance, neither the W estern  Hemisphere nor Japan and its neighbors form  a 
bloc. The only group of countries w hich is presently acting w ith  the discipline of a bloc, at 
least in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, are the m em bers of the European 
Com m unity (EC). H ow ever, even the im plem entation of a common com m ercial policy by 
the EC can be seen as exceptional, w hen contrasted w ith  the recent vagaries of the  
European M onetary System  (EM S), not to  mention the inability to  deal jointly w ith  the  
major crisis in Europe's ow n "backyard," which has splintered the form er Yugoslavia. As 
Stanley Hoffm ann said recently, in an article titled "Goodbye to  a United Europe," in The  
N ew  York Review  of Books of 27  M ay 1 9 9 3 , "m any Europeans find it d ifficult to  identify  
w ith  a 'Europe' th a t remains a purely econom ic and bureaucratic construction and shows  
fe w  signs of becoming a nation."
Also, those w ho see the North Am erican Free Trade Agreem ent (N AFTA) as the  
nucleus of a future bloc in the W estern  Hemisphere should look carefully a t its accession  
clause (W D W /1 5 /9 3 ) , deliberately le ft open to the participation of any interested country, 
w ithout specifying geographic criteria.
Finally, those w ho see Japan emerging as the hub of a new  bloc in East Asia should 
go to  their history books, as w ell as to  recent reports by the W orld Bank and the  
International M onetary Fund about econom ic trends in that part of the world.
First of all, the recently released W orld Bank's Global Economic Prospects and the  
Developing Economies 1 9 9 3  (W D W /1 2 /9 3 ) , sees the trends in East Asia and the Pacific 
moving in a d ifferent direction than those w ho already see the existence of a Japanese 
bloc. Instead, the W orld Bank sees the em ergence of a "Chinese econom ic area (CEA), 
comprising China, Hong Kong, and T a iw an ,"  as a "fourth world pole of the global 
econom y." The key factors leading the W orld Bank to  conclude that the CEA is emerging  
as a new  grow th pole in the world econom y are: "large and growing econom ic mass, 
strongly affecting other economies; persistence of medium term  grow th in the face of 
shifting external circum stances; and high degree of sustainability of long-term grow th ."
The W orld Bank sees the CEA as a leading m arket and as a com petitor in low er 
technology, labor-intensive products, contributing to  the short-term  stability of the  world  
econom y and performing as "a counter-cyclical force in the Pacific Basin." In confirm ation  
of these trends, the recently released IM F 'S  W orld Economic Outlook (W D W /1 1 /9 3 )  
contains an annex introducing "a new  set of w eights for aggregation of output across 
countries based on estim ates of purchasing power parities (PPPs)," d ifferent from the  
"previous w eights, w hich w ere  based on m arket exchange rates."
On the basis of the new  calculation, China's GDP increases from $ 4 0 0  billion to  
$ 1 .7  trillion, making it just slightly smaller than the Japanese econom y, as opposed to  the
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10th  position it occupied according to m arket exchange rates calculations. M oreover, the  
World Bank projects that by the year 2 0 0 2 , at standard international prices, the Chinese 
economic area's GDP will am ount to  $ 9 .8  trillion, slightly above the $ 9 .7  trillion projected  
for the United S tates in the same year. The main difference remains in per capita income, 
projected to  increase in the United S tates to  $ 3 6 ,0 0 0  in the year 2 0 0 2 , while the CEA's  
per capita income will only am ount to  $ 7 ,3 0 0  in the same year.
Furthermore, according to  a study by Hong Kong's Trade Developm ent Council, 
described in The Journal of Com m erce, increasing levels of economic integration already  
exist betw een China, Hong Kong and Taiw an  in certain industries. For instance in 
foo tw ear, Hong Kong last year exported $ 4 .8  billion, including foo tw ear originating in 
mainland China, which makes it the second largest world exporter of foo tw ear, only behind 
Italy. A lso, Ta iw an  is investing in foo tw ear production in mainland China, through the  
establishm ent in Hong Kong of subsidiaries of more than 1 ,0 0 0  Taiw anese companies.
M IT  Professor Paul Krugman com m ented in The N ew  York Tim es that "the main 
importance of this is geopolitical. It's  a remainder th a t China is a great pow er already, 
which is something many people haven 't quite grasped yet."
O f course, the Chinese governm ent im m ediately rejected the new  calculations. A  
spokesperson from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, quoted in The Journal of C om m erce, 
declared that the IMF report "overestim ated the economic output of China," adding that "it 
had a long w ay  to catch up even w ith  w hat he called medium developed countries."
IV . 3 . HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT  
(W D W /1 9 /9 3  3 0  JUNE 1 9 9 3 )
This year's World Developm ent Report (W DR) is dedicated to investing in health. As  
described in the foreword by World Bank President Lewis Preston, it com plem ents the  
previous three W DRs, dedicated to  "an overview  of the goals and m eans of developm ent,"  
which focused on poverty, developm ent strategies and the environm ent. By contrast, this 
year's dedication to "a single sector in which the im pact of public finance and public policy 
is of particular importance" will be also observed next year by focusing on infrastructure. 
Thus, having dealt w ith  some of the key global issues, the W orld Bank continues setting  
the developm ent agenda, starting this year also w ith  certain key sectors.
A  recognition of some of the past accom plishm ents leads to  an identification of 
present challenges. For instance, "over the past forty years life expectancy has improved  
more than during the entire previous span of human history." In 1 9 5 0 , life expectancy in 
the developing countries w as forty years; in 1 9 9 0 , it w as 6 3  years. H ow ever, "despite  
remarkable im provem ents, enormous health problems remain." For instance, m ortality rates 
in developing countries are still "unacceptable high;" while child m ortality rates are still 
"ten tim es higher" than those of w hat are called "established m arket econom ies."
The reasons for the persistence of these problems is found in some of the  
characteristics exhibited by the health system s of developing countries. First, through
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misallocation of resources in "interventions of low  cost-effectiveness," w hereby a single 
teaching hospital can absorb up to 2 0  percent of the budget of the ministry of health. 
Second, inequity through the poor's lack of access to  basic health services, because 
"governm ent spending for health goes disproportionately to  the affluent." Third, 
inefficiency through w asted expenditures, such as "the purchase of brand-name 
pharm aceuticals instead of generic drugs." Fourth, because of expanding costs, w ith  
expenditures growing faster than incom e, particularly in middle-income developing 
countries. In these conditions, "the potential for misallocation, w aste  and inequitable  
distribution of resources is huge."
Even so, a major governm ent role in the provision of health services is unavoidable, 
for the following reasons. First, health related services are public goods w hich private  
m arkets by them selves scarcely provide. A lso, health services have large externalities and 
"governm ents need to  encourage behaviors that carry positive externalities and to  
discourage negative externalities." Second, "cost-effective services to  the poor is an 
effective and socially acceptable approach to  poverty reduction." Third, "governm ent 
action m ay be needed to com pensate for problems generated by uncertainty and insurance 
m arket failure."
In such conditions, some of the policy choices available, especially to address the  
health needs of the poor, are described in term s of "a tree-pronged approach."
First, to  "foster an environm ent th a t enables households to  improve health," by 
implementing grow th policies that will benefit the poor, through the expansion of 
investm ent in schooling, particularly for girls, and of the rights and status of w om en.
Second, to  concentrate spending in "efficiently financing services th a t will 
particularly benefit the poor". This entails spending "on average 5 0  percent less...on less 
cost-effective interventions and instead double or triple spending in basic public health  
programs such as im m unizations." As a consequence, spending should be redirected to  
im plem ent "a package of public health interventions to  deal w ith  the substantial 
externalities surrounding infectious disease control, prevention of A ID S , environmental 
pollution and behaviors...that put others a t risk." Also, a package of "essential clinical 
services" should be financed particularly in the low-incom e countries. Finally, the  
m anagem ent of governm ent health services should be improved, through decentralization  
and contracting out of services.
Third, "leave the remaining clinical services to be financed privately or by social 
insurance w ithin  the context of a policy fram ew ork established by the governm ent." Also, 
foster com petition and diversity, to  drive dow n costs in the rest of health care services, 
provided privately but paid by governm ent or social insurance.
Som e of these recom m endations are more relevant for d ifferent groups of countries. 
For instance, low-incom e countries are advised to  emphasize "basic schooling for girls, 
strengthening of public health programs, and support for expanded public financing of 
essential clinical services." M iddle-incom e countries should focus on "reducing public 
subsidies for insurance and discretionary care." The form erly socialist economies should 
prioritize "improving the m anagem ent of governm ent health services and developing
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sustainable health-financing system s th a t maintain universal coverage w hile encouraging  
com petition among cost-conscious suppliers."
Finally, the international com m unity should support these policy reform s by 
"redirecting donor m oney from hospitals and specialist training to  public health programs 
and essential clinical care." Also, those "countries th a t are willing to  undertake major 
changes in health policy should be strong candidates for increased aid, including donor 
financing or recurrent costs."
IV . 4 . THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE
(W D W /2 9 /9 3  2 0  OCTOBER 1 9 9 3 )
Prodded by the Japanese Executive Director and funded by the Japanese 
governm ent, the W orld Bank has completed and published an evaluation of the "miracle" 
experienced by the economies of East Asia--Japan, "the Four Tigers," Hong Kong, Korea, 
Singapore and Ta iw an , and the "new ly industrializing economies (NIEs)," Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand.
The "essence of the m iracle," consists of the rapid grow th of these econom ies, 
since 1 9 6 0 , at an average of more than five percent, unsurpassed by any other region of 
the world. Real income per capita increased "more than four tim es in Japan and the. Four 
Tigers and more than doubled in the Southeast Asian NIEs."
Additionally, these economies w ere "unusually successful in sharing the fruits of 
grow th ." These are "the only economies that have high grow th and declining inequality," 
and w here "the fastest growing East Asian economies, Japan and the Four Tigers, are the  
most equal." For instance, the proportion of people living in absolute poverty, dropped 
"from 58  percent in 1 9 6 0  to 17 percent in 1 9 9 0  in Indonesia, and from 3 7  percent to  less 
than 5 percent in M alaysia."
Besides this impressive perform ance, these economies also differ from other 
developing economies on three basic factors. First, "high rates of investm ent, exceeding  
2 0  percent of GDP on average betw een 1 9 6 0  and 1 9 9 0 , including in particular unusually 
high rates of private investm ent." Second, "high and rising endow m ents of human capital 
due to  universal primary and secondary education." These tw o  factors "account for 
roughly tw o-thirds of the grow th" in these economies. Finally, "the remainder is 
attributable to improved productivity," resulting from "the combination of unusual success 
at allocating capital to high-yielding investm ents and a t catching up technologically to  the  
industrial econom ies."
The report's contents illustrate how these issues are addressed: 1) distinguishing 
characteristics: rapid grow th w ith  equity; 2) policy explanations: the relationship betw een  
public policy and economic growth; 3) pragmatism and flexibility in policy formulation: 
m acroeconom ic stability and rapid grow th of m anufactured exports; 4) the role of 
institutions: the interaction betw een a technocratic elite w ith  key leaders of the private 
sector; 5) public policy and the rapid accum ulation of physical and human capital; 6) public
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policies, the effic ient allocation of resources and productivity growth; 7) conclusion: East 
Asian pragmatism and policies in a changing world econom y. H ow ever, it is the  
explanation offered to account for this "miracle" that is illustrative of the more profound 
debate about the role of public policy.
If these economies did it by "getting the basics right," these "fundam ental policies 
do not tell the entire story," because "the governm ent in tervened-system atically  and 
through multiple channels--to foster developm ent, and in some cases the developm ent of 
specific industries."
T w o  broad view s are presented as explanations of the role of public policy. First, 
the "neoclassical v iew " emphasizes the "success in getting the basics right." Second, the 
"revisionist v iew " has shown th a t "East Asia does not wholly conform to the neoclassical 
m odel," because "industrial policy and interventions in financial m arkets are not easily 
reconciled w ith  the neoclassical fram ew ork."
The authors of the "East Asian M iracle" try  to  remain som ew here in betw een. First, 
they indicate that it is "very difficult to  establish statistical links betw een grow th and a 
specific intervention and even more d ifficult to establish causality." Even so, they adm it 
that "in a fe w  economies, mainly in North East Asia, in some instances, governm ent 
interventions resulted in higher and more equal grow th than otherwise would have 
occurred."
In the end, the report supports the eclectic view point laid out in the World 
Developm ent Report 1 9 9 1 . that "expands on the neoclassical v iew " to propose a "m arket- 
friendly strategy." In such a strategy, "the appropriate role of governm ent is to  ensure 
adequate investm ents in people, provide a com petitive clim ate for private enterprise, keep 
the econom y open to  international trade, and maintain a stable m acroeconom y."
O therw ise, "governm ents are likely to  do more harm than good, unless interventions are 
m arket friendly."
No w onder, the form er Japanese Executive Director of the W orld Bank Masaki 
Shiratori, w ho sponsored and secured the financing for the study and now  is the V ice- 
President of Japan's Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, declared that "the Bank is still 
obsessed w ith  neoclassical thinking." H ow ever, Mr. Shiratori recognizes th a t the study is 
"a good first step."
Nancy Birdsall, a m em ber of the research team  that carried out the study w ho  
recently left the W orld Bank to become Executive Vice-President of the Inter-Am erican  
Developm ent Bank (IDB), also believes th a t "despite its conservatism it marks an im portant 
shift." Because, "until now  the W orld Bank has been view ed as putting the burden of proof 
on others." W ith  the publication of the "East Asian M iracle," Birdsall says, "the burden of 
proof is on those w ho w ant to  show intervention is clearly harm ful."
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IV . 5 . POVERTY REDUCTION IN EAST ASIA : THE REAL MIRACLE  
(W D W /3 0 /9 3  27  OCTOBER 1 9 9 3 )
The debate th a t led to  the publication by the W orld Bank of The East Asian Miracle 
(W D W /2 9 /9 3 ) has been cast in term s of the role of public policy in the accom plishm ent of 
the phenomenal grow th performance of these economies. H ow ever, this emphasis on the  
role of the state and rapid economic grow th , to a certain exten t, obscures the remarkable  
results accomplished by these economies in the fight against poverty.
The impressive figures of poverty reduction in East Asia are described in a W orld  
Bank Discussion Paper, by Frida Johansen, released in July 1 9 9 3  by the East Asia and 
Pacific Division. According to  Johansen, "absolute poverty has decreased dram atically in 
East Asia," from more than a third of the population in 1 9 7 0 , to  a fifth  in 1 9 8 0  and to  an 
estim ated tenth in 1 9 9 0 .
H ow ever, "absolute numbers are perhaps more impressive than percentages." 
Focusing on six countries that account for more than 9 0  percent of the population of East 
Asia--China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand--"the absolute poor 
in the six countries numbered some 3 8 0  million in 1 9 7 0 , 2 9 0  million in 1 9 8 0 , and some 
1 5 0  million in 1 9 9 0  . . . reductions all the more remarkable as the East Asian population 
grew  by some 4 2 5  million persons over the tw o  decades." These figures contrast w ith  
those of other regions. For instance, "in 1 9 9 0  the absolute poor remained at around half of 
the population in South Asia and Africa and a fourth in Latin A m erica."
Of the six countries studied, "China has made the most impressive progress in 
poverty reduction, perhaps ever. From 2 7 5  million absolute poor in 1 9 7 0 , or one of every  
three people, progress started to accelerate in the late 1 9 7 0 s  and continued at a high pace 
until the m id -1980s , that resulted in only one of every te n --1 0 0  m illion-being poor by 
1 9 9 0 ."  The number of persons involved is also impressive. "Since 1 9 7 0 , China has lifted  
175  million out of poverty and added 3 0 0  million more people above the poverty line."
The case of Indonesia is equally outstanding given the numbers involved. In the  
1 9 7 0 s , Indonesia had "more than half of its population in absolute poverty -som e 70  
m illion-and after steady progress, by 1 9 9 0  the poverty incidence w as only some 1 5 %  and 
the number of poor, 27  million." The number of persons involved is again impressive. 
"Indonesia lifted 4 3  million out of poverty and added 6 0  million more people above the  
poverty line."
The cases of Korea and Malaysia do not involve as m any persons, "but it probably 
w as as difficult because they reached the marginal poor normally bypassed by overall 
econom ic grow th ." Consequently, "in 1 9 9 0 , less than 5 %  of the populations of Korea and 
Malaysia remained in absolute poverty."
Finally, the case of the Philippines is even more striking, since it reduced "the 
incidence of absolute poverty by about a third in the 1 9 8 0 s , to  2 0 %  of the population," or 
13 million, "w ithout much economic grow th."
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Social indicators are also used as a com plem ent to  the m easurem ent of the  
incidence of poverty. "Just as absolute poverty w as much reduced, social indicators w ere  
much improved even in countries w here economic grow th faltered." For instance, average  
per capita food intakes increased by m ore than 1 0 % ; life expectancy at birth increased by 
three to  four years, to  an average of 6 3  years; infant m ortality declined by alm ost one- 
third; fertility rates decreased w ith  the use of contraceptives, w hile death rates fell faster 
and the population increased a t a slower pace; average illiteracy rates w ere  reduced by a 
third, and the goal of universal primary education w as achieved; the percentage of 
population in cities rose from a fourth to  a third; and the proportion of people served w ith  
safe drinking w ater and sanitation also increased.
The factors behind these im provem ents are summarized as follows: "increased 
provision of basic services, targeted interventions, and broad-based econom ic grow th."  
Am ong the provision of public services there prominently appear w ater and sanitation, 
health services, including fam ily programs, and primary education. Targeted programs w ere  
required to "m ake inroads into the deeper poverty pockets."
H ow ever, the vice-president of the East Asia and Pacific Region of the W orld Bank 
states th a t "there is no room for com placency." Still, "1 8 0  million people remain poor in 
East Asia--about equal the number of poor in Sub-Sahara A frica. And the poverty that 
remains is of the more intractable kind found in pockets thus far bypassed by the general 
grow th and social programs that have raised others out of poverty."
To m eet these challenges the East Asian governments need "to better identify the  
poor and their most pressing needs" and to  carry out "substantial institution-building to  
design and im plem ent programs to improve assistance delivery." Also, present 
"demographic trends imply changing rather than lessened demand on health services." 
Additionally, the quality of fam ily programs "is a challenge because the number of w om en  
in childbearing age continues to grow ." Finally, public expenditure in universal primary 
education and food availability must be preserved. In these term s, "further reducing the  
number of poor in the 19 9 0 s , the study concludes, is likely to  be more difficult than it w as  
in the 19 8 0 s ."
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V. CAPITAL FLOWS TO THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
V . 1 REMEMBER THE DEBT CRISIS?
(W D W /2 /9 3  27  JA N U A R Y 1 9 9 3 )
As recalled by the W orld Bank's Chief of the Debt and International Finance 
Division, Massoud Ahmed and by the form er Chief Economist, Lawrence Sum m ers, now  
Undersecretary of the Treasury-Designate for International A ffairs, "ten years have passed 
since M exico 's inability to  service its debts triggered a rapid succession of similar moratoria 
by other debtor countries."
Accordingly, this year's World Debt Tables 1 9 9 2 -9 3 . released by the W orld Bank on 
17 Decem ber 1 9 9 2 , include a retrospective from which some lessons are draw n about the  
making and the m anagem ent of the debt crisis.
As a sign of the tim es, tw o  new  features also appear in this year's Debt Tab les . 
First, data on portfolio flow s are included to calculate the aggregate net flow s and net 
transfers for developing countries. Such equity flow s have been of considerable importance  
for some middle-income countries, those w ith  a per capita income of betw een $ 6 3 6  and 
$ 2 ,5 5 5 , particularly in Latin Am erica. Second, since the republics of the form er Soviet 
Union (FSU) are now members of the Bank, the Tables include data on the debt of these  
republics, estim ated to  am ount to $67  billion.
Here are some of the highlights contained in the first volume of Analysis and 
Sum m ary Tab les:
1) at the end of 1 9 9 2 , the total external debt of all developing countries is projected 
to  increase to  $ 1 ,7 0 3  billion, from $ 1 ,6 0 8  billion at the end of 1 9 9 1 .
2) The debt-to-exports ratio for developing countries in 1 9 9 2  is expected to  remain 
almost unchanged at 178  percent, while the debt service-to-exports ratio is expected to  
decline to 19 percent from 21 percent in 1 9 9 1 , continuing the dow nw ard  trend of recent 
years.
3) Total debt stocks owed by Latin Am erica and the Caribbean are expected to  
increase slightly in 1 9 9 2  to  $ 4 4 7  billion, from $ 4 4 0  billion in 1 9 9 1 . These stocks represent 
alm ost 3 7 .6  percent of GNP, down from 4 1 .4  percent in 1 9 9 1 , or 2 4 8 .4  percent of total 
exports of goods and services, dow n from 2 5 8 .4  percent in 1 9 9 1 . In these term s, the debt 
service-to-exports ratio rose slightly from 2 9 .5  percent in 1991 to 3 0 .3  percent in 1 9 9 2 .
4) Aggregate net resource flow s to  developing countries, understood as net flow s  
on long-term debt, grants excluding technical assistance, and net flow s on equity  
investm ent, including foreign direct investm ent (FDD and portfolio direct investm ent (PDI), 
increased sharply in 1 9 9 2  (by $ 1 9  billion), to  reach a projected $ 1 3 4  billion. As a
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percentage of GNP, in 1 9 9 2  aggregate net transfers amounted to 1 .2  percent, compared to  
0 .9  percent in 1 9 9 1 .
5) Latin Am erica and the Caribbean showed the most marked increase in capital 
inflows, w ith  aggregate net flow s, as w ell as transfers, remaining generally unchanged in 
1 9 9 2 . A lso, for several Latin Am erican countries, such as Chile, Costa Rica, M exico, 
Venezuela and Uruguay, debt indicators have fallen to  pre-19 8 2  levels. H ow ever, it is 
recognized that these countries "have paid a heavy price in foregone developm ent and 
falling per capita incomes but, for them , the debt crisis is finally over."
In response to  the question if the  debt crisis is over, the conclusion is th a t "for the  
com m ercial banks and some of their m iddle-income developing-country borrowers, the debt 
crisis th a t began ten years ago is largely over." This is so mainly because "developing- 
country debt no longer poses a system ic threat to  the international banking system ." 
H ow ever, for m any low and lower-m iddle-incom e countries in Sub-Saharan A frica, indebted  
largely to  official bilateral creditors, "the crisis is certainly far from over."
On the basis of an evaluation of the past decade, Ahmed and Sum m ers "w ith  a 
great deal of humility" derive some lessons:
First, "heavy borrowing that is not accompanied by productive investm ents is a 
disaster for creditor and debtor alike."
Second, "countries that 'opted out' of the international financial system  have 
generally done worse as a result."
Third, "economic adjustm ent takes tim e and things often get worse before they get 
better, so attention to  the political and econom ic sustainability of reform is in the interest 
of both the creditors and the debtors."
Fourth, "there is a compelling need for official action to  overcome free rider 
problems that com plicate debt reschedulings and reductions." U nfortunately, "during the  
heyday of Laissez Faire enthusiasm  during the m id -1980s , at least some officials lost sight 
of it."
Fifth, "treating the debt crisis purely as a liquidity problem delayed the search for a 
stable and real solution."
Thus, "the debt crisis, m ay no longer be the principal preoccupation of the  
international com m ercial banks, but it is far from over for m any of the countries involved, 
among them  some of the poorest." For these countries, "the real need is to  increase 
concessional financing," thus, "doubling of all the net resource flow s to developing 
countries last year would add a little over $ 1 6  billion to  the aid bill of the industrialized 
w orld--just 1 percent of w h at the world spends on defense each year."
To conclude w ith  a positive note, Ahm ed and Summers assert that "as recently as 
five years ago, fe w  could have predicted th a t much of Latin Am erica would today be 
wrestling w ith  the question of how  to  m anage large-scale capital inflow s."
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V . 2 . EXTERNAL FINANCE A N D  DEVELOPMENT  
(W D W /1 8 /9 3  2 3  JUNE 1 9 9 3 )
The last Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 1 9 9 3  
(W D W /1 2 ,1 6 /9 3 ) ,  issued by the World Bank, is dedicated to  the role of external finance in 
developm ent. The topic is tim ely and constitutes probably the most salient issue of the  
nineties in developm ent economics.
As the debt crisis and the profound recession dominated the eighties, the nineties 
already seem dominated by w h at the W orld Bank characterizes as a "new  pattern of 
external finance," resulting from the "increased financial integration of developing countries 
w ith  global capital m arkets."
The new  pattern in external finance can be illustrated by contrasting the figures for 
the beginning of the eighties w ith  those of the beginning of the nineties. For instance, in 
1 9 8 1 , official loans, grants and suppliers and export credits amounted to  4 4  percent of all 
financial flow s to developing countries, w ith  bonds, portfolio equity and foreign direct 
investm ent (FDD amounting to 9 .6  percent, while commercial bank loans dom inated w ith  
46 .1  percent. In 1 9 9 1 , by contrast, grants, official loans and suppliers and export credits 
am ounted to  5 7 .6  percent, followed by 25  percent in portfolio equity, bonds and FDI, and 
commercial bank loans representing only 1 7 .4  percent.
These more intense levels of financial integration for the developing countries are 
described as "a mixed blessing," w hereby the consequent "increased vulnerability" to  both 
outflow s or capital flight, as well as to speculative inflows of hot m oney, through careful 
m anagem ent, can be "outweighed by reduced cost of capital and better possibility to  
hedge external shocks."
A t issue is if the developing countries have an option to avoid the external shocks 
to  w hich they are exposed, because they are more vulnerable to  such adverse shocks. As 
measured in term s of GDP, external shocks of about 4  percent are "not unusual in low  and 
middle income countries (LM ICs)."
The main source of these external shocks is found m ostly in adverse term s of trade, 
such as oil price shocks, as well as volatility in com m odity prices. Other sources of 
adverse shocks, such as external finance and interest rates, have been relatively less 
im portant.
The industrial countries are less exposed to  large shocks and they are usually able 
to  finance their w ay  out by running greater current account deficits or low er surpluses. By 
contrast, the developing countries traditionally do not rely on financing to  w eather shocks 
and they are generally exposed to  capital flight, or w h at the W orld Bank calls "one-w ay  
integration." The suggested alternative is described as enhancing "tw o -w a y  integration  
that permits capital inflows and private institutional outflow s."
The policy issues generated by these increased levels of financial integration are 
relatively well known. On one side, there are certain benefits, such as "a lowering of the
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cost of capital, an increase in the sharing of risks...and a promotion of the effic iency of 
resource mobilization and allocation through improved relative prices." H ow ever, policy­
makers will also confront both "reduced room for m aneuver and the external creditor's  
tolerance for poor perform ance," as w ell as m onetary and exchange rate dilemmas.
Be it as it m ay, each one of the sources of finance available generates its ow n  
policy dilem m as. For instance, while FDI increases access to  technology and export 
perform ance, the Bank recommends it "should not be relied upon for m edium -term  balance- 
of-paym ents financing, in part because profit rem ittances are often high." Additionally, FDI 
requires "a transparent legal fram ew ork th a t does not discriminate betw een local and 
foreign investors; adopting a liberal foreign exchange regime; and creating investor-friendly  
regulations and institutions."
Perhaps the most spectacular increase is found in private portfolio flow s, since 
"both bonds and equity have grow n explosively from 1 9 8 9  to  1 9 9 2 ."  For instance, to  the  
Latin Am erican countries, "gross equity portfolio flow s...have  grown more than tenfold in 
four years, from US$ 4 3 4  million in 1 9 8 9  to  an estim ated U S$ 5 .6  billion in 1 9 9 2 , while  
international bond issues have show n equally dram atic grow th."
The main benefit to  developing countries of these flow s, in the form  of "repatriated  
flight capital, some high risk-high return funds, and som e--the minor part-institu tional 
investm ent by pension funds, insurance com panies, trust funds, and m oney m arket funds," 
is a reduction in the cost of capital. To  illustrate the potential magnitudes available, it is 
estim ated that "if industrial country investors held developing country securities in the  
same proportion as the emerging m arkets share of global m arket value (currently 6 
percent), resource flow s would increase by U S$ 4 0  billion per year...an  increase th a t is 
bigger than the current flow s of FDI."
Contrary to  some com m only held beliefs, "concerns over the sustainability of 
portfolio flow s stem largely from  the fear of a change in source-country economic  
conditions." Even so, "access to  portfolio flow s should prove to be reasonably durable, 
provided recipient countries persist in their policy reform s." H ow ever, the Latin Am erican  
countries are advised that they "should not expect to  receive such large flow s in future  
years as they did in 1991 and 1 9 9 2 ."
Finally, at the end of the Cold W a r, aid or official developm ent assistance (ODA) 
"needs to  increase, be better focussed and less tied to  donor procurem ent."
V . 3 . THE C O M M ERCIAL BANKS W A N T  GUARANTEES  
(W D W /2 8 /9 3  13 OCTOBER 1 9 9 3 )
Everybody is liking its wounds a fter the ruffling of the debt crisis. For instance, the  
com m ercial banks have declared th a t th ey  are willing to  return to  lending to  the developing  
countries, but under certain conditions.
This is the message contained in this year's  letter addressed to the Belgian Finance
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Minister Philippe M aystadt, the chairperson of the Interim C om m ittee, by the new  
Managing Director of the Institute of International Finance (IIF), M r. Charles Dallara.
The IIF, it should be recalled, w as created in 1 9 8 3  by the largest commercial banks, 
at the height of the debt crisis, "to collect and disseminate tim ely and impartial information  
and analysis on the economic and financial situation, policies and prospects of developing 
countries having substantial debts tow ard  the banking com m unity."
W ith  the dwindling of the debt crisis, and a decrease in membership from 2 0 0  to  
1 7 5  commercial banks, the IIF has now a new  Managing Director in search of a new  role. 
M r. Dallara's public and private background gives him the necessary credentials to  try  to  
find such a role. From 1 9 8 9  to  m id-1 9 9 1 , he w as Assistant Secretary of the U .S . Treasury  
for International Affairs; in 1 9 8 8 -8 9  he w as  Assistant Secretary of the U .S . Treasury for 
Policy Developm ent; and from 1 9 8 4  to  1 9 8 9 , he w as U .S . Executive Director at the  
International M onetary Fund (IM F). M ost recently, he w as managing director at J.P.
Morgan, responsible for operations in central Europe and the form er Soviet Union. As he 
recently declared, "public policy issues will never look the same to me . . .  I learned w hat it 
really takes to  m ake cross-border banking business attractive for major banks."
In m any w ays, this year's letter by the IIF to  the Interim  C om m ittee, reveals this 
search for a new  role for the commercial banks. The letter addresses "the need to  restore 
more vigorous grow th in the industrial world," and "the need to achieve definitive 
progress in trade liberalization." The letter also deals w ith  "the need to support the  
econom ic reform efforts of emerging m arket countries and to catalyze private capital flow s  
to  these countries," and "the need to ensure that the policies of the multilateral institutions 
are effective ly  advancing your objectives in these critical areas."
It is in relation to  the last tw o  points that the letter m akes some new  proposals. 
First, there is a recognition that the developing countries "have taken a new  significance in 
contributing to  global grow th and trade," since these countries "now account for more 
than one-third of the w orld 's output and trade." Second, the letter registers the positive 
response from private capital m arkets, indicating that private capital flow s to  these 
countries--from which the commercial banks remain conspicuously ab sen t-"h ave  increased 
from $ 2 3  billion in 1 9 8 8  to $ 8 5  billion in 1 9 9 2 ."  Furthermore, "equity investm ent flow s  
have doubled, from about $ 2 0  billion in 1 9 8 8  to almost $ 4 0  billion in 1 9 9 2 ."
The letter also points out to the increasing role that Latin Am erican borrowers have 
played in these flow s, tapping the "international m arkets for more than $ 2 0  billion in new  
financing over the last three years." Additionally, portfolio investm ents in Latin Am erican  
capital m arkets have "also grown impressively." Finally, the letter admits th a t "commercial 
bank loans to Latin Am erica are beginning to  expand, but nevertheless remain m odest to  
date, reflecting in part the still recent memories of the debt problem."
H ow ever, the letter also indicates that "external financing raised in international 
bond and equity m arkets, as well as through local capital m arkets, will not be sufficient 
and will need to  be catalyzed through special programs." Additionally, "large-scale 
commercial bank project financing will also be needed," and this poses a challenge to  
w hich the international financial institutions (IFIs) will have to  respond.
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First, "the task of fostering com m ercial bank flow s" is now  different, since "it is 
m ostly in the form  of trade or project financing, not the general balance of paym ents  
financing of the past." For this, "a m odest participation by the W orld Bank Group in a 
supportive role in project financing or joint venture m ight be sufficient to  catalyze  
significant private capital." There are cases w here  "aspects of political risk in m any  
emerging m arkets are so great as to  pose overriding disincentive to  private capital." In 
these cases, "focusing I FI instrum ents on w h a t is needed a t the margin to  m ake projects 
more attractive to  private lenders, for exam ple, could be particularly e ffective ."
Finally, since there are still some leftovers from the debt crisis, the letter calls for 
"solving the remaining debt problems," such as those of Brazil, Russia, Poland, Peru, 
Ecuador and Panama. It w arns that "the continued 'to lerance' of arrears poses a serious 
disincentive to renew ed com m ercial bank lending, including project financing." Not 
everybody agrees. Harvard Professor Jeffrey  Sachs has countered th a t "the IMF should use 
its leverage to force commercial banks to  reach quick agreem ent on reasonable term s."
In essence, the com m ercial banks are willing to  return to  lending to  developing 
countries. H ow ever, this tim e they just need some credit enhancem ents to  reduce the  
risks.
V . 4 . PRIVATE M ARKET FINANCING  FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
(W D W /3 2 /9 3  10 NOVEMBER 1 9 9 3 )
In recognition that there is a new  pattern of external finance for the developing 
economies (W D W /1 8 /9 3 ) , in this year's  report on capital m arkets, the International 
M onetary Fund (IMF) includes a chapter dedicated exclusively to  this issue. Divided in tw o  
parts, the chapter first "describes recent experience w ith  securitized capital flow s,"  
comprising international bonds, short-term  debt instrum ents, and equities.
Developing countries issued bonds in international m arkets am ounting to a record 
$ 2 3  billion, almost double the am ount of 1 9 9 1 . Still, this represented "7 percent of global 
issuance activ ity , compared w ith  4  percent in 1 9 9 1 ."  More than half of this am ount, or 
$ 1 2  billion, corresponded to borrowers from  the W estern  Hem isphere, w ith  M exico again 
as "the leading borrower in the international bond m arket, raising close to  $6  billion." Also, 
Argentine borrowers almost doubled their participation in the international bond m arket, 
w hile Brazilian and Venezuelan entities also increased their participation. Additionally, 
new com ers from Latin Am erica and the  Caribbean gained access to the international bond 
m arket, w ith  Uruguay and Trinidad and Tobago raising $ 1 0 0  million each. Asian borrowers 
also expanded their access, raising around $ 6  billion.
This "increased availability of bond financing w as accompanied by a gradual 
broadening of the range of borrowers," w ith  private sector issuers representing 4 2  percent 
in 1 9 9 2 , compared w ith  31 percent in 1 9 9 1 . On the supply side, this w as a consequence 
of the privatization programs and the high interest rates prevailing in Latin Am erica. On the  
dem and side, this w as a result of the decline of yields on public sector issues in most 
countries.
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In dollar denominated short-term securities, "M exican banks w ere in the vanguard in 
developing the m arket for Euro-certificates of deposits (Euro-CDs), but the range of 
borrowers in this m arket broadened in 1 9 9 2  to  include borrowers from  Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, M exico, Peru and Venezuela." The am ount of Euro-CDs issued by Latin Am erican  
banks, by April 1 9 9 2 , "amounted to $ 1 3  billion." Due to  regulations imposed by the Banco 
de M exico on short-term external borrowing by commercial banks, a fter April 1 9 9 2 , issues 
of Euro-commercial paper (Euro-CP) "picked up m arkedly." By contrast w ith  the "9  Euro-CP 
programs" launched in 1 9 9 1 , "w ith  a total issuance ceiling of about $1.1  billion, 2 0  
programs w ere set up in 1 9 9 2 , w ith  a total issuance ceiling of $ 3 .2  billion; issuers w ere  
m ainly M exican corporates but also included the United M exican S tates and several private 
sector Argentine and Brazilian companies."
There w as some international interest even "in certain dom estic-currency  
denominated short-term debt instrum ents." For instance, "in 1 9 9 2 , $ 5 .9  billion w as  
invested by foreigners in Mexican governm ent papers, mainly in C e te s -M e x ic o 's  federal 
governm ent treasury bills."
By contrast to  the 19 8 0 s , "the recent interest of international investors in emerging 
m arkets and the w ave of privatizations in several countries have led to a surge in 
international equity placem ents by developing country com panies." The cum ulative am ount 
issued by these companies since 1 9 9 0  in international equity m arkets am ounted to  $ 1 6  
billion. "In 1 9 9 2  alone, companies from 21 developing countries raised $ 9 .4  billion in this 
m arket (some 41 percent of total international primary equity issuance)."
Latin Am erican companies "w ere at the forefront of the new issue boom and 
accounted for over 6 0  percent of all international equity issues by developing countries." 
H ow ever, during the second half of 1 9 9 2 , "equity issues by Latin Am erican corporations  
dropped abruptly, reflecting the sharp decline in share prices in most of the main Latin 
Am erican stock m arkets."
In response to this m arket correction, "in contrast w ith  1 9 9 1 , w hen a sharp 
increase in issuance of mutual funds targeting Latin Am erica w as observed, funds issued in 
1 9 9 2  targeted mainly emerging m arkets in Asia." Furthermore, "managers of existing 
global funds reportedly reallocated their assets aw ay  from Latin Am erican m arkets tow ard  
Asian m arkets, while managers of Latin Am erican funds substantially increased cash 
holdings."
Syndicated bank lending, in 1 9 9 2 , "remained subdued," given the banks' reluctance  
"to take on new  exposure to developing countries." Short-term  credits, essentially trade  
finance, remained dom inant, while "medium- and long-term bank loan com m itm ents to  
capital importing developing countries declined from $ 1 6 .7  billion in 1991 to  $14 .1  billion 
in 1 9 9 2 ."  In the tighter international credit conditions prevailing, "Asian borrowers 
accounted for 7 4  percent of new  syndicated bank credit com m itm ents to  capital importing 
developing countries in 1 9 9 2 ."  Simultaneously, "some renewed interest emerged in lending 
to  selected Latin Am erican borrowers (including Chilean corporates and M exican and 
Venezuelan public sector oil exporters), although banks remained cautious about new  
exposure to  the region."
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This contrasted w ith  the buoyancy prevailing in the secondary m arket for bank 
claims on developing countries. Securitized bank debt in developing countries, by the end 
of 1 9 9 2 , "increased to $ 6 5  billion, comprising $ 5 8  billion in 'Brady bonds' and $7 billion of 
bonds issued by Brazil in Novem ber 1 9 9 2  securitizing interest arrears accum ulated in 1 9 8 9  
and 1 9 9 0 ."
V . 5 . A  NEW  PATTERN OF DEVELOPING CO UNTRY FINANCING  
(W D W /3 3 /9 3  17 NOVEMBER 1 9 9 3 )
The second part of the chapter dedicated to  financing for the developing economies, 
in the recent study by the International M onetary Fund on capital m arkets (W D W /3 2 /9 3 ) ,  
highlights some issues raised by the "new  financing pattern." It deals w ith  the broadening 
of the investors base; the 1 9 9 2  m arket correction; the role of regional financial centers; 
and the system ic implications of the evolving financing pattern.
By contrast w ith  Asia, w hich continues attracting "m ainstream  institutional 
investors such as pension funds and insurance companies from industrial countries," Latin 
Am erica is d ifferent. W hat is called "the rediscovery of Latin Am erican securities," w as  
brought about "by capital flight and global investm ent funds." Even so, the study 
recognizes th a t "the investor base for Latin Am erican securities has begun to  broaden in 
the past year w ith  increased participation by m ainstream  institutional investors."
According to a survey of institutional fund managers active in emerging m arkets, 
"these m anagers quadrupled the share of their international portfolios allocated to  emerging 
m arkets, from  2 .5  percent of global international portfolios in 1 9 8 9  to 10  percent in 
1 9 9 2 ."  Latin Am erica "accounts for 3 9  percent of institutional investors' emerging m arkets  
portfolios," while the Pacific Rim accounts for 4 9  percent and only 10  percent has gone to  
Eastern Europe.
Still, m ainstream  institutional investors "appear to have followed a more 
conservative investm ent strategy," investing in "emerging m arket equities" not even five  
percent of total foreign equity holdings, or an am ount equivalent to  only 0 .2  percent of 
total assets.
H ow ever, there are differences among "source regions." For instance, "U .S . based 
investors, including flight capital and investm ent funds, have shown the m ost interest in 
Latin Am erican m arket re-entrants." This is attributed to  "the substantial presence of flight 
capital as w ell as other investors fam iliar w ith  high-yielding, if risky, subinvestm ent grade 
securities."
In conclusion, "although investor base has broadened recently, involvem ent by 
m ainstream  institutional investors in developing country securities remains lim ited."
Som e "main constraints to  investm ent on developing country securities" are singled 
out, such as "concerns about econom ic and political fundam entals." Also constraining is 
"lim ited inform ation and the poor liquidity of emerging m arket assets." In these conditions,
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"the m arket re-entry by Latin Am erican issuers w as subject to  a correction from June 1 9 9 2  
on the equity side and during the last quarter of 1 9 9 2  on the bond side." Additionally, 
"international equity issues from the region almost com pletely dried up during the second 
half of 1 9 9 2 ."
This correction led to "a general reappraisal of the m arket for Latin Am erican  
securities as investors and investm ent banks realized th a t progress tow ard  expanding the  
investor base beyond flight capital and high net w orth  investors w as more limited than  
m any had w anted to  believe."
Hong Kong and Singapore are presently the "tw o  major full-service offshore  
centers" located in developing countries. This is a result of "high rates of saving and 
relative w ealth , the close netw ork of interrelationships of the overseas Chinese com m unity, 
and the increasing importance of intraregional trade and investm ent flow s." In Latin 
Am erica in the long-run, it is predicted that "intraregional flow s will grow in importance ... 
as incomes increase, local financial centers become more sophisticated and capable, and 
progress is made tow ard regional integration and cooperation."
To conclude, some "systemic implications" of this new  financing pattern, 
characterized as "securitization of flows/disinterm ediation from the com m ercial banks," are 
spelled out. First, the resilience of the international financial system  is helped by the  
"greater scope now  exists for price adjustm ents, which m ay signal emerging difficulties  
before the situation deteriorates to where access is cut o ff."  Second, since "an increasing 
proportion of cross-border flow s are in the form of securities held by non-banks, balance 
of paym ents difficulties experienced by developing countries would not directly put a t risk 
banks and the international payments system ." In these term s, third, "adjusting to  debt- 
servicing difficulties would likely involve a drop in the price of securities and result in the  
decline of financial w ealth  of investors."
Consequently, "the new  financing pattern seems to imply low er system ic risks than  
the bank credit flow s of the 1 9 7 0 s  and the 1 9 8 0 s ."  Even so, emerging m arkets still have 
"a fairly shallow domestic investor base, a limited range of actively traded shares, and 
financial asset prices that have been particularly volatile." The hope is that "greater 
openness may help broaden the investor base, deepen the m arket, transfer more 
sophisticated investm ent strategies, and ultim ately stabilize emerging m arkets."
M eanw hile, "com petition among international asset m anagers, combined w ith  the narrow  
range of liquid m arkets in which they can invest, could m ean that a concerted m ove in the  
same direction might generate a large am ount of financial asset price volatility."
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VI. TRADE
V I. 1. PRESIDENT CLINTON ON TRADE  
(W D W /8 /9 3  10  M ARCH 1 9 9 3 )
In the middle of the intense cam paign to  get his dom estic economic package 
approved (W D W /6 /9 3 ), President Clinton found the tim e to  go to  Am erican University to  
address the issue of trade. The speech constitutes a recognition, in the President's term s, 
th a t "the truth of our age is this--and m ust be this: open and com petitive com m erce will 
enrich us as a n ation ...It promotes global grow th w ithout w hich no rich country can hope 
to  grow  w ealth ier." Briefly, "in the face of all the pressures to  do the reverse, w e  must 
com pete not re trea t.”
President Clinton sees the United S tates facing, at the end of the Cold W ar, "the  
third great m om ent of decision in the 2 0 th  century." The choice is betw een "the m istakes  
of the 19 2 0 s  or the 19 3 0 s  by turning inw ard," or "the successes of the 19 4 0 s  and the  
19 5 0 s  by reaching outw ard."
To enforce his vision, the President outlined the following "five steps:"
First, to  put the "economic house in order," by doing "w hat no generation of 
Am ericans has ever been called upon to  do before: to increase investm ent in our 
productive future, and to reduce our deficit at the same tim e."
Second, "to make trade a priority elem ent of Am erican security," based on 
reciprocity, by w hich "none of us should expect something for nothing." In this context, 
the President promised to support "a prompt and successful completion of the Uruguay  
Round," and also repeated his support to  the North Am erican Free Trade A greem ent 
(N A FTA ), if it can "ensure that the environm ent, th a t living standards, th a t working  
conditions, are honored." He then turned to  Asia, offering to  "w ork w ith  organizations, 
such as the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, to liberalize...trade across the  
Pacific as w e ll.”
Third, the President promised "to exercise leadership among the major financial 
powers to  im prove...coordination on behalf of global economic grow th." H ow ever, he 
realistically recognized the limits of such cooperation, saying th a t "None of us is very good 
a t it. A m erica doesn't w an t to  give up its prerogatives. The Japanese don 't w an t to  give 
up theirs. The Germans don't w a n t to  give up theirs." Even so,"the fac t is th a t the world  
can 't grow  if Am erica is in recession, but it will be difficult for us to  grow  coming out of 
this recovery unless w e can spark a renew ed round of grow th in Europe and in Japan."
Fourth, the "need to  prom ote steady expansion of grow th  in the developing world" 
w as recognized, "not only because it's  in our interest, but because it will help them  as 
w ell."
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The final step w as defined as to  support "the success of dem ocracy in Russia and 
in the w orld 's other new  dem ocracies." Forcefully, the President concluded, "if w e  are 
willing to  spend trillions of dollars to  ensure com m unism 's defeat in the Cold W ar, surely 
w e  should be willing to invest a tiny fraction of th a t to  support dem ocracy's success 
w here communism failed."
These steps w ere characterized as "an agenda for Am erican action in a global 
econom y," where "there is no such thing as a purely domestic policy."
The reactions to the speech did not m ake them selves w a it. In London, w here the  
finance ministers of the G-Seven w ere m eeting, the reaction w as positive. The Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Norman Lamont declared, the speech "dem onstrates the com m itm ent of 
the United S tates to  free trade."
By contrast, The W all Street Journal saw  the speech as evidence th a t the President 
is practicing "a good cop-bad cop stance," resulting from a fractured economic team  where  
Secretary of the Treasury Lloyd Bentsen and his deputy Lawrence Summers are the "good 
cops," pushing for free trade, while the USTR M ickey Cantor is the "bad cop," pushing for 
retaliation against European subsidies to  the Airbus. In a similar vein, an editorial in The  
Journal of Com m erce saw the President "walking a tightrope," asking "can someone who  
believes governm ent should intervene early and often in the m arketplace to lerate the  
Darwinism  of free trade, particularly w hen that means short-term  suffering for some U.S. 
industries?"
Latin Am erican observers w ere perplexed because the President did not mention the 
extension of the NAFTA to other trading partners in the Hemisphere. Some w anted to  
believe this w as a consequence of the delays in appointing the Adm inistration's Latin 
Am erican team . H ow ever, these interpretations w ere dispelled by a s tatem ent m ade by 
Paula Stern, form er "senior economic and trade advisor to  President Clinton during the  
campaign" and one of the leading contenders to  head the USTR. In an op-ed in The Journal 
of C om m erce, the form er chairwom an of the International Trade Commission praised the  
President for avoiding the "danger that the new administration would fo llow  in the  
footsteps of its predecessors and appear to give inordinate attention to  the W estern  
Hem isphere." She praised the President because he "deftly moved to  allay the fears of our 
Asian trading partners, as well as some in Europe, by demonstrating th a t he does not seek 
to  establish a W estern Hemisphere trading bloc that will shut them  out."
Beyond these interpretations, soon there will be an opportunity to  assess the  
Adm inistration's interest in pursuing the negotiations of the Uruguay Round and in the  
W estern  Hemisphere, because the tim e is running out to request a renewal of the fast track  
authorization, which expires on M ay 3 1 .
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V I. 2. THE U.S. TRADE POLICY AGENDA FOR 1 9 9 3  
(W D W /9 /9 3  17 M ARCH 1 9 9 3 )
T h e  release of this year's trade policy agenda has experienced some delay, although 
the docum ent is ready w ith  an introduction by the new  U .S . Trade Representative, 
Am bassador Michael Kantor.
As m andated by Section 1641 of the Omnibus Trade and Com petitiveness A c t of 
1 9 8 8 , "the President shall submit to the Congress during each calendar year (but not later 
than March 1 ) a report on A) the operation of the trade agreem ents program ...and B) the  
national trade policy agenda for the year in which the report is subm itted." Both are 
presented in a single volume titled 1 9 9 3  Trade Policy Agenda and 1 9 9 2  Annual Report of 
the President on the Trade Agreem ents Proaram .
In the introduction, Am bassador Kantor summarizes the last speech by President 
Clinton on trade, made at Am erican University on February 2 6  (W D W /8 /9 3 ), highlighting 
"several key principles that guide the Adm inistration's thinking on trade issues."
First, as presented in the President's economic package (W D W /6 /9 3 ), trade policy is 
"part of a coordinated and integrated econom ic strategy;" second, the overall objective is 
defined as "expanding trade through m arket opening measures backed by the rigorous 
enforcem ent of U .S. laws;" third, trading partners are "expected to live up to  their 
com m itm ents so that their m arkets becom e com parably open;" fourth, those seeking relief 
are expected to "undertake reforms designed to  boost their future com petitiveness;" fifth , 
econom ic interests will no longer be "autom atically subordinate" to  foreign policy or 
defense concerns because "national security is closely bound w ith ...econom ic  strength  
here at hom e."
The five "main priorities" of this year's  agenda are:
to "vigorously press forw ard" w ith  the Uruguay Round;
to "achieve the objectives of the North Am erican Free Trade A greem ent by 
negotiating critically im portant supplemental agreem ents;"
"other bilateral and regional initiatives" in the Pacific Rim and in the W estern  
Hemisphere, in th a t order, highlighting the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation  
forum as "particularly promising;"
"resolutely enforce existing trade agreem ents and U .S . trade law s to  open
more export m arkets;"
to incorporate new  issues in the agenda, such as environmental protection, 
com petition and technology policies.
The comparison betw een these five priorities w ith  the three objectives of the 1 9 9 2  
Agenda reveals the degree of continuity and change brought about by the new  
Adm inistration. First, there is coincidence on the completion of the Uruguay Round.
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Second, even w ith  the addition of the "supplemental agreem ents," there is coincidence as 
well on the approval of the N AFTA. Third, the most conspicuous difference is found in the  
regional agreem ents, because this year's agenda gives the same priority to  the Pacific Rim 
and to the W estern  Hemisphere, w ith  the reference to  the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation forum contrasting w ith  the silence about the Enterprise of the Am ericas (EAI). 
Fourth, while this years's agenda promises to  "resolutely enforce" law s and agreem ents, 
last year's  relied more on the "strength of the U .S . dom estic m arket." Finally, the new  
issues mentioned this year are by all means new .
On the Uruguay Round, the agenda recognizes the impossibility of completing it 
before the expiration of the existing fast-track authorization, thus, "the Adm inistration is 
proposing legislation that would renew the fast-track authority." H ow ever, no m ention can 
be found about requesting fast track authority to negotiate free trade agreem ents w ith  the  
rest of the Hemisphere.
On the conclusion of the NAFTA, it is hoped that the supplemental agreem ents will 
be concluded "as soon as possible to maintain N A FTA 's scheduled im plem entation in 
January 1 9 9 4 ."
Under "other bilateral and regional initiatives," first comes the Pacific Rim, 
particularly the relations w ith  Japan and China. Europe fo llow s, emphasizing the European 
Com m unity, Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Last come "the A m ericas," dealt 
w ith  in a single paragraph, which recognizes that "several nations in this region have 
instituted far-reaching reforms designed to shrink their budget deficits, reduce their foreign 
debts, and open up their economies to  global com petition." The paragraph concludes 
positively, recalling that "President Clinton has said that success in the N AFTA  could well 
pave the w ay  for trade expanding arrangem ents w ith  other m arket-oriented countries in the 
W estern  Hemisphere."
The enforcem ent of agreem ents and laws deals w ith  several current disputes, such 
as governm ent procurement w ith  the European Community; dumping and subsidies in 
steel; the resurrection of Section 201 of the 1 9 7 4  Trade A ct, as am ended, providing 
remedies to  domestic industries injured by increased imports; finally, it is announced that 
"the Clinton Administration is considering the increased use of Section 301 in appropriate 
circum stances, in order to  encourage the opening of more foreign m arkets."
On the new  issues, besides environmental protection, com petition and technology  
policies, "a more intense focus" is promised on labor standards, intellectual property rights, 
and investm ent.
V I. 3 . BARRIERS TO U.S. EXPORTS  
(W D W /1 0 /9 3  28  April 1 9 9 3
This year's National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers is the first one 
issued under the stewardship of the new  United S tates Trade Representative (USTR) 
M ickey Kantor. It w as released on M arch 3 1 , as m andated by section 1 3 0 4  of the
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Omnibus Trade and Com petitiveness A c t of 1 9 8 8 . It used to  be th a t the yearly release of 
this Report w as aw aited  w ith  some anxiety. A fte r all, it w as the behavior cited in the  
Report w hich served as the basis for the initiation of the much dreaded "super 301 " 
investigations. In their turn, such investigations could lead to  U .S . retaliation against 
alleged imposition of barriers against U .S . exports. This year's Report should be read 
having in mind the possibility of a resurrection of such investigations. Am bassador Kantor 
recently announced that "USTR staff have begun a comprehensive review  of the m ost 
significant barriers in the NTE Report and are identifying those barriers th a t can best be 
addressed through the use of Section 3 0 1 , if our current bilateral or m ultilateral efforts  do 
not result in m arket-opening m easures."
For this reason, w ithout going all the w ay  back to such practices, discarded by the  
previous Adm inistration, Ambassador Kantor indicates that the Report "will facilitate the  
achievem ent of the Adm inistration's overall trade policy objective which is to  expand trade 
through m arket opening m easures backed by the rigorous enforcem ent of U .S . law s."
This is som ew hat stronger than last year's description of the 1 9 9 2  Report by then  
USTR Carla Hills as "a useful tool for tracking barriers to  U .S . exports and for reporting 
progress in eliminating them ."
The definition of trade barriers used in the Report remains unchanged and it 
comprises "governm ent law s, regulations, policies, or practices that either protect 
dom estic products from foreign com petition or artificially stim ulate exports of particular 
dom estic products."
These barriers are classified in eight different categories: 1) import policies; 2) 
standards, testing, labeling, and certification; 3) governm ent procurement; 4 ) export 
subsidies; 5) lack of intellectual property protection; 6) services barriers; 7) investm ent 
barriers; and 8) barriers that encom pass more than one category or that a ffec t a single 
sector.
The Report describes the barriers existent in "the largest export m arkets for the  
United S tates," including for the first tim e under one category the so-called "newly  
independent states"--A rm enia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, 
Tajikistan, Turkm enistan, Ukraine, and U zbek is tan -as  well as tw o  regional trading bodies-- 
the European Com m unity and the Gulf Cooperation Council.
By contrast w ith  last year, the list of Latin Am erican countries cited remains 
unchanged, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, G uatem ala, 
M exico, Paraguay and Venezuela.
The exclusion of countries is "due primarily to  the relatively small size of their 
m arkets or the absence of a major U .S . industry and agriculture trade com plaints."  
H ow ever, those absent are specifically cautioned that "the omission of particular countries 
and barriers does not imply th a t they are no longer of concern for the United S tates."
Measured by the length of their citations, Japan appears in the first place w ith  28  
pages, follow ed by the European Com m unity w ith  16 pages; Canada w ith  15 pages; China 
12; Australia, Korea, M exico and T a iw an  10  pages each; and India 9 .
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Each country is listed alphabetically and the enum eration of the barriers is preceded 
by ranking each country according to  its relative importance as an export m arket for the  
United States. The Report also includes the m agnitude of the U .S . deficit or surplus w ith  
each trading partner, the am ount of U .S . imports, exports and investm ent, as well as 
estim ates of the im pact on U .S . exports of specific foreign trade barriers.
Not all the practices of the Latin Am erican countries cited are negative. For 
instance, the governm ent of Argentina is praised for the reduction of traditional border as 
well as non-border measures. Brazil and Ecuador are praised for the reduction of traditional 
border measure barriers, particularly the near elim ination of import licensing, w hile Chile 
preserves its clean record.
How ever, almost all the Latin Am erican countries, w ith  the exception of M exico, are 
criticized by the lack of intellectual property protection, as w ell as by the imposition of 
some investm ent and some services barriers.
For lack of intellectual property protection, six of the Latin Am erican countries-- 
Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatem ala and V en ezu e la -a re  on the "w atch  
list," while Brazil is in the "priority w atch  list" under the "special 3 0 1 "  provision of the  
1 9 8 8  Trade A ct. Ambassador Kantor recently said th a t the USTR is reviewing the  
performance of those countries included in these "w atch  lists" and th a t the results of the  
review  would be announced by April 3 0 .
Finally, El Salvador and Guatem ala are cited for the im plem entation of import 
restrictions on poultry and of a price band mechanism for basic grains, w hile Guatem ala is 
also cited for allowing imports of w heat flour by permit only.
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VII. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA)
V II. 1. PRESIDENT C LIN TO N 'S  INTER-AM ERICAN POLICY  
(W D W /5 /9 3  2 OCTOBER 1 9 9 3 )
One of the first Latin Am erican and Caribbean actions of the Clinton Adm inistration  
remains snarled in a confrontation w hich is bringing back the scent of some anachronistic 
Cold W ar ingredients. The appointm ent of the next Assistant Secretary of S tate  for Inter- 
Am erican A ffairs has been paralyzed by a debate dominated by accusations of softness  
against communism and by counter-charges of racism.
M eanw hile, this skirmish about the appointm ent of w h a t adm ittedly is the m ost 
visible and the highest ranking Latin Am erican position in the S tate  D epartm ent, in e ffec t, 
has overwhelm ed other signals w hich are indicating th a t the Inter-Am erican policy of the  
incoming Adm inistration m ay have already been adopted.
The basic objectives of the new  policy are contained in the last report of the Inter- 
Am erican Dialogue, Convergence and Com m unity: The Am ericas in 1 9 9 3 . tim ely  released  
by m id-Decem ber of last year.
The Dialogue describes itself as "W ashington's only center for policy analysis 
dedicated primarily to U .S .-Latin  A m erican relations, and to  convening policymakers, 
business and financial leaders, heads of non-governm ental organizations and intellectuals  
seeking practical responses to hemispheric problems."
Co-chaired by Peter Bell from the United S tates and by the form er Secretary General 
of the United Nations Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the Dialogue's President, until January 2 0 , 
w as Richard Feinberg.
The report begins stating that it "cannot recall a tim e w hen the opportunities for 
constructive and sustained cooperation among W estern  Hemisphere nations have been 
greater--or w hen the potential payoffs from  such cooperation have been larger."
T w o  major factors are identified as contributing to  these new  tim es: first, "the Cold 
W ar is over and U .S. policy tow ard Latin Am erica is no longer shaped and constrained by a 
preoccupation w ith  security m atters;" second, "Latin Am erican concerns about U .S . 
political and economic dominance in the region have subsided, along w ith  fears of 
unilateral U .S . intervention."
The following three main challenges are identified by the Dialogue as facing the  
hemisphere in the 19 9 0 s  and they define the main guidelines of its policy 
recom m endations:
1) "To forge an economic com m unity that will span the Am ericas and, w ithin a 
generation, could incorporate nearly one billion people." For this purpose the Dialogue
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urges im m ediate action on the ratification of the North Am erican Free Trade Agreem ent 
(N A FTA ), giving appropriate attention to  the environm ent and to  w orkers' rights; the  
forging of viable sub-regional trade pacts in Latin Am erica and the Caribbean, while  
sustaining internal processes of economic reform and trade liberalization; to  begin 
consultations on criteria, procedures, and tim etables for building N A FTA into a W estern  
Hemisphere free trade pact; to  promptly begin negotiations w ith  those countries which  
m eet the entry requirements to  the N A FTA , w ith  Chile as the likely first candidate; 
negotiations should also begin w ith  the countries of Central Am erica and the Caribbean, 
because NAFTA will "impose some im m ediate losses on these countries;" finally, the  
establishm ent of a "new multilateral organization to guide and coordinate progress tow ard  
a W estern  Hemisphere Economic Com m unity," asking th a t "existing regional economic 
organizations--the Inter-Am erican Developm ent Bank (IDB), Organization of Am erican  
States (OAS) and United Nations Economic Commission for Latin Am erica and the  
Caribbean (ECLAC)--should play prominent roles in the new  coordinating body, along w ith  
private business, trade unions, and other non-governmental organizations."
2) To sustain and deepen the progress "toward the form ation of a dem ocratic  
political com m unity in the W estern Hemisphere," the Dialogue proposes to  promote 
negotiated settlem ents of the remaining guerrilla conflicts; to  exam ine the missions, size, 
w eapons, and costs of the armed forces of the W estern  Hem isphere, "w ith  the objective of 
establishing firm civilian control over the military;" to  respond rapidly to  breakdowns of 
dem ocratic rule, as decided in the Santiago resolutions of the OAS; to  enhance the  
capacity of the OAS to play a leadership role in situations of dem ocratic breakdown.
3) "The most difficult challenge facing the Am ericas today," is identified as the  
struggle against social and economic inequity. For this purpose the same priority should be 
given to  alleviating poverty and to  the promotion of growth; anti-poverty strategies should 
emphasize efforts to  raise productivity among the poor, particularly w om en; income 
transfer programs should be targeted to the neediest and most vulnerable; programs to  
reduce poverty must be consistent w ith  m acroeconomic stability and should be financed  
through some combination of increased taxes, the reallocation of existing expenditures, 
and external aid; finally, external organizations should support national anti-poverty  
programs.
Recent signals indicate that these m ay become the central elem ents of the new  
Adm inistration's Inter-Am erican policy. Particularly relevant is the appointm ent of several 
signatories of the Dialogue's report to key positions in the new  Adm inistration, such as 
Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior; Henry Cisneros, Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Developm ent; Dianne Feinstein, elected Senator from California; Federico Peña, Secretary  
of Transport; Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary of S tate . Last but not least, form er Dialogue 
President Richard Feinberg is now Special Assistant to  the President and Senior Director for 
Latin Am erican and Caribbean Affairs, at the National Security Council (NSC).
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V II. 2 . THE OPPOSITION TO  THE N A FTA  
(W D W /2 3 /9 3  8 SEPTEMBER 1 9 9 3 )
Gone are the days w hen it w as  com m on wisdom  th a t a small country should avoid 
becoming involved w ith  a bigger partner. There w as  an inherent disadvantage for the  
smaller partner emanating from asym m etry. H ow ever, if you listen to  the argum ents  
presented by those w ho are against the approval of the North Am erican Free Trade  
Agreem ent (NAFTA ), those days are gone because the reverse is now  true. It is the biggest 
partner w ho  is bound to experience the m ost profound losses, because of the s ta m p e d e -  
described by M r. Ross Perot as the "giant sucking sound " -o f  jobs and investors moving 
south of the border. This is better illustrated by the title  of M r. Perot's book, w ritten  w ith  
Mr. Pat Choate, well known for his criticism of foreign lobbyists, Save vour Job. Save our 
Country. W hy NAFTA must be S to p p e d -N o w !
The debate has now m oved beyond academ ic argum ents about w inners and losers 
into the level of sound-bites and the Larry King show . In the term s of the conservative  
columnist and form er presidential candidate Pat Buchanan, "the heart has reasons th a t the  
mind knows not," because Am ericans "do not w an t to see this republic married off to  a 
Third W orld nation of 8 0  million whose average w age is 15 percent of our ow n."  
Consequently, M r. Buchanan concludes, "N A FTA  is about Am erica's sovereignty, liberty  
and destiny . . . NAFTA is an econom ic Munich, an Am erican M aastricht."
The other partners m ake the coalition against the NAFTA look as formidable as it is 
heterogeneous. Very few  issues have exhibited the capability of bringing to  the sam e side 
of M r. Perot and Mr. Buchanan leaders such as the Reverend Jesse Jackson and alm ost all 
m em bers of the congressional black caucus; the consumer advocacy group Public Citizen, 
founded by M r. Ralph Nader and several environm ental groups, such as the Sierra Club and 
the Humane Society; and Mr. Lane Kirkland of the AFL-CIO and M IT  Professor Noam  
Chomsky.
Out of this heterogeneous gathering, the environmental groups w ere  the only ones 
to  experience a profound fracture. Once the negotiation of the side agreem ent on the  
environm ent w as com pleted, some of the m ost powerful environmental organizations came  
out in support of the N AFTA. Among them , the National W ildlife Federation, the W orld  
W ildlife Fund, the Nature Conservancy, the Audubon Society, the Environmental Defense  
Fund, the Natural Resources Defense Council and Defenders of W ildlife. Not surprisingly, 
those organizations which remained in the opposition, such as the Sierra Club and Friends 
of the Earth, decided to  go to  court. They supported a petition, presented by the Public 
Citizen to  a district judge, requiring th a t the Adm inistration, before sending the N A FTA  to  
Congress, should carry out an environm ental im pact assessment.
Even so, the campaign against the N A FTA , unleashed by w h at The W ashington  
Tim es characterized as such an "unusual coalition," does not seem to reflect the opinion 
prevailing among the m ajority of the citizens. According to  a recent NBC-W all S treet 
Journal survey, 4 4  percent of those interrogated declared they did not have an opinion, 
because they did not know enough about the agreem ent; w hile only 2 7  percent w ere  in 
favor and 2 5  percent w ere against it.
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Given these startling figures, the real w eight of the opposition against the NAFTA  
should be measured in strictly political term s. The outcom e depends on the number of 
those w ho vote in favor or against it in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, 
w here the approval of the NAFTA needs 2 1 8  and 51 votes, respectively.
According to some recent vote counts, in the Senate the NAFTA  will pass w ith  the  
support of a t least 3 4  of the 4 6  Republicans and 16  of the 5 4  Dem ocrats. In the House, 
the N A FTA will pass if it obtains betw een 125  and 1 4 0  votes from  the 1 7 5  Republicans 
and betw een 75  to  8 5  votes from the 2 5 8  Dem ocrats. Presently, the NAFTA has the firm  
support of only 67  Dem ocrats.
This small number of supporters among the Dem ocrats is a reflection of the  
profound divisions that this issue has caused among them , and of the consequent 
cautiousness that the Administration has exhibited about the issue.
H ow ever, where these divisions have appeared more poignantly is among the House 
Dem ocratic leadership. First, the House Speaker Thom as Foley of W ashington declared 
that he personally "tended to support" the NAFTA , although "the House Dem ocratic  
Leadership w as so badly divided that it would not take a position on the vote."
The second highest ranking Dem ocrat in the House, M ajority Leader Richard 
Gephardt of Missouri declared, after looking at the side agreem ents on the environm ent 
and on labor standards, that he would be unlikely to support the agreem ent. Finally, the  
most active opposition is coming from the third highest ranking Dem ocrat, House Majority  
W hip David Bonior of Michigan w ho declared that "there is no official position in our 
caucus here; w e 're  free to do w hat w e w an t."
W ith  the Dem ocratic Party leadership profoundly divided, the NAFTA can only be 
approved w ith  the strong support of the Republicans. This will com pensate for some of the  
strong opposition that presently exists w ithin the ranks of the Dem ocrats.
V II. 3 . THE NAFTA VOTE
(W D W /3 4 /9 3  2 4  NOVEMBER 1 9 9 3 )
Rarely has the most salient trait of the contem porary U .S . trade policy-making  
process been played out w ith  such clarity. The debate and approval last w eek  of the North 
Am erican Free Trade Agreem ent (NAFTA) fully confirmed the script of w h at Robert Pastor 
has characterized as the "cry and sigh syndrom e." In this characterization of trade policy­
m aking, the "cry" corresponds to  the protectionist uproar th a t em anates from  Congress 
w henever it is asked to enact trade legislation. This is followed by the "sigh," w hich comes 
w hen it is realized that the resulting legislation is not as protectionist as the preceding 
debate anticipated. W hat seems to happen is th a t the voices of protectionism are so loud 
that they end up conjuring enough opposition to  counter the initial threatening impulse.
W ith  the benefit of hindsight, the NAFTA debate followed faithfully the script 
depicted by the "cry and sigh syndrome," except during several m om ents w hen it w as  felt
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that the initiative w as tilting in the opposite direction. For instance, the coalition assembled 
against the NAFTA w as as formidable as it w as heterogeneous (W D W /2 3 /9 3 ).
"Ideologically chaotic," according to  Thom as Edsall of The W ashington Post, it w as  "the  
strangest coalition ever assembled on a key issue," said Norman Ornstein from  the  
Am erican Enterprise Institute (AEI).
This coalition comprised nativists and protectionist Republicans, as Pat Buchanan; 
ill-defined populist centrists, as Ross Perot; a solid bloc of environmental and consumer 
activists, as the Sierra Club and the even better known advocate Ralph Nader; some 
bulwarks of the Dem ocratic Party, as the m ost powerful representatives of organized labor 
from the AFL-CIO; several individuals representative of the liberal wing of the Dem ocratic  
Party, as the Reverend Jesse Jackson; finally, there w ere some prominent dissident 
academ ics, such as M IT  Professor N. Chom sky. H ow ever, more im portant w as  th a t this 
heterogeneous coalition counted w ith  the support of the second and third highest ranking 
Dem ocrats in Congress, none other than the House M ajority Leader Richard Gephardt (D- 
M o.) and the M ajority W hip David Bonior (D -M ich.)
Against this formidable lineup, no w onder at tim es the NAFTA w as thought dead 
and beyond resuscitation. First, President Clinton took a while before he cam e out in full 
force in favor. W ith  hindsight, this initial hesitation can be explained because the issue w as  
generating profound divisions w ith in  the President's ow n party.
Even so, it w as  the a ttem pt by the  Texas billionaire Ross Perot, to  lead the  
opposition against the N A FTA , w hich triggered the top echelons of the Clinton 
Adm inistration to come out forcefully in favor of its approval. This transform ed the free  
trade debate into a nasty dispute for the populist factions of both the Republican and the  
Dem ocratic parties. Thus, the public cam paign for the NAFTA started w ith  Perot's 
m aneuver and closed illustratively w ith  the debate betw een vice-president Gore and Perot 
him self, spectacularly won by the vice-president.
There w ere other m om ents of pessimism. First, the defeats by the Dem ocratic  
candidates in the City of N ew  York, and the states of N ew  Jersey and Virginia, weakened  
President Clinton's coattails in the eyes of those representatives that are due for reelection. 
Then cam e the crushing defeat experienced by the Canadian incum bents, w ho supported 
the N A FTA enthusiastically. Finally, just a fe w  days before the vote, while the Republicans 
stood ready to deliver their share of the votes required, the President w as seen as still 
struggling to  obtain enough votes w ith in  his ow n party. And it w as in this last stage when  
the President w as seen at his best, in Ornstein's term s, "tw isting arm s, making deals and 
reviving a presidency."
The final yes votes in the House revealed the toughness of the battle , 1 3 2  out of 
1 7 5  Republicans, or three fourths, and 1 0 2  out of 2 5 8  Dem ocrats, or less than half. Still, 
the Republicans delivered a dozen votes more than expected, w hich led to  the spectacular 
victory of 2 3 4  to  2 0 0 .
The divisiveness of the issue w as evident in the Hispanic caucus, split betw een nine 
in favor and eight against, revealing th a t the  Hispanics have yet to  articulate a common  
position in foreign affairs. The tw o  Cuban Republicans from Florida voted against, as did 
the tw o  most prominent Puerto Ricans from  N ew  York and the only Puerto Rican from  N ew
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Jersey. M ost of the M exican-Am ericans, led by Bill Richardson (D -N M ), cam e out in 
support, except Henry Gonzalez (D -TX). By contrast, out of the forty  m em bers of the Black 
Caucus, only nine voted yes.
Additionally, according to  a study by the pro-Dem ocratic Economic Policy Institute  
(EPI), quoted in The W ashington Post, "the NAFTA vote pitted the nation's cities against 
the urban areas. Urban members of Congress from both parties opposed NAFTA  6 8  to  51 . 
. . w hile suburban and rural representatives w ere 1 8 3  to  1 3 2  in favor."
The NAFTA vote provided President Clinton, in the term s of The W all Street 
Journal, w ith  a "crucial victory," that placed international trade issues a t the center of the  
political spectrum , based on a bipartisan majority. If this coalition in favor of an open 
international trading system holds, the NAFTA vote will become a decisive setback for the  
nativists, the protectionists and the isolationists from both parties.
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VIII. BEYOND NAFTA
V II I .1. THE IN STITU TIO N A L D IM ENSIO N  
(W D W /1 4 /9 3  2 6  M A Y  1 9 9 3 )
A  debate is taking place in W ashington, "inside-the-Beltw ay," on the best 
institutional alternative to support the expansion of the North Am erican Free Trade  
A greem ent (NAFTA) to  the rest of the Hem isphere. H ow ever, in institutional as w ell as in 
other m atters , Shakespeare in The M erchant of Venice (A ct I, Scene II) warned some tim e  
ago th a t "if to do w ere as easy as to  know  w h at w ere good to  do, chapels had been 
churches and poor m en's cottages princes' palaces."
The debate w as ignited and fueled by a proposal made by tw o  prominent figures 
from the group of W ashington-based non-governm ental organizations (NGOs), dedicated to  
Latin Am erican and Caribbean affairs. Som e tim e ago, Richard Feinberg, then V ice- 
President of the Overseas Developm ent Council (ODC) and Peter Hakim , then S ta ff Director 
of the Inter-Am erican Dialogue, proposed the creation of an "Am ericas Commission," a 
whole new  institution dedicated to  push forw ard the process of Hemispheric trade  
liberalization. The Feinberg-Hakim reasoning w as simple, "none of the hem isphere's  
existing institutions, as presently constituted, can adequately address the exigencies of the  
trade com ponent."
Also, from the W est Coast cam e another proposal aimed a t the creation of a new  
institution. Given the costs of im plem enting the N A FTA , particularly the environm ental 
clean-up along the U .S .-M exico  border, University of California Professors A . Fishlow, R. 
Hinojosa-Ojeda and S. Robinson proposed the creation of a new  "North Am erican regional 
developm ent bank and adjustm ent fund." The creation of this new  bank, a t some point, 
received some endorsem ent at high decision-making levels of the M exican Governm ent.
H ow ever, as Shakespeare knew  very w ell, accomplished institutional outcom es are 
better explained by values and culture, rather than by the successful imposition of decrees 
based on the pondering of arm -chair strategists.
For these reasons, prem ature institutionalization entails some risks and perils. First, 
an old m axim  from architecture warns th a t "form should follow  function," or against 
putting the cart before the horse. Second, the "rooster syndrome" afflicts certain Third 
W orld roosters w ho hope that by singing earlier, they can m ake the sun rise earlier. Finally, 
in these tim es of budget cuts and resource constraints, unnecessary duplications should be 
carefully avoided.
Additionally, recent institutional outcom es, in the NAFTA  and the Common M arket 
of the South (M ERCOSUR), reveal th a t governm ents may be exhibiting a certain degree of 
resistance regarding the creation of n ew  perm anent institutions. In the case of N A FTA , 
overseeing the enforcem ent of the agreem ent is entrusted to  a Commission integrated by 
governm ent representatives at m inisterial level, while a secretariat formed by offices w ithin
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each m em ber governm ent will support the functioning of the Commission. The sam e can 
be found in MERCOSUR, w here there exists only a very small adm inistrative secretariat, 
staffed w ith  personnel from the Uruguayan governm ent and charged w ith  servicing the  
communications and docum entation required by the numerous inter-governm ental bodies 
entrusted w ith  enforcing mutually agreed obligations.
In other words, given the risks and perils of premature institutionalization, as w ell as 
recent sub-regional institutional experiences, there is a good case for trying to  use the  
existing institutions before concluding that w hat is necessary at this point is the creation of 
a new  commission or a new  bank.
As indicated by very recent signals, the new  Adm inistration in W ashington has 
decided that it is willing to  espouse, w ith  even more fervor than its predecessor, the  
objective of building a Hemispheric-wide free trade area. As opposed to  the alternative of 
doing this through separate bilateral agreem ents, probably the best m eans for such a 
purpose will be found in opening the membership in the N A FTA , by implementing the  
accession clause.
In such a case, the imm ediate issue will rather be how to enhance the readiness to  
negotiate among the potential candidates. Presently, the countries of the Hemisphere find 
them selves at quite d ifferent levels of readiness to travel the som ew hat lengthy road 
required by the transition tow ards the ambitious goal of building a full-fledged free trade  
area. Furthermore, it can be safely assumed that this transition m ay at least take w h a t is 
left of the decade.
Thus, the im m ediate task consists of patiently strengthening the groundwork and 
the building blocks to  sustain and nurture the environm ent of mutual knowledge and trust 
required to  undertake mutually beneficial negotiations. The requirements spelled out by the  
USTR as essential to  negotiate can be summarized as follows: a stable m acroeconom ic  
environm ent and m arket oriented policies, as well as openness to foreign investm ent and 
trade w ith  intellectual property protection. Besides these requirem ents, the governm ents  
should organize them selves internally and regionally to  carry out lengthy negotiations, 
which will also demand a more active presence in W ashington. For these purposes, it is 
better to  ask the existing institutions to set up a joint effort to  support the negotiations. As  
they have already done in the past, to im plem ent the Alliance for Progress, the  
Organization of Am erican S tates (O AS), the Inter-Am erican Developm ent Bank (IDB) and 
the Economic Commission for Latin Am erica and the Caribbean (ECLAC) should be asked  
to  set up, w ith  their own resources, a "tripartite technical facility" to  support the  
negotiations.
V III. 2 . IMPLEMENTING THE ACCESSION CLAUSE
(W D W /1 5 /9 3  2 JUNE 1 9 9 3 )
The accession clause, which appears as Article 2 2 0 5  of the North Am erican Free 
Trade A greem ent (NAFTA), reads as follows:
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"1 . A ny country or group of countries m ay accede to  this Agreem ent subject to such term s  
and conditions as m ay be agreed betw een such country or countries and the Commission  
and following approval in accordance w ith  the applicable approval procedures of each  
country. 2. This A greem ent shall not apply as betw een any Party and any acceding 
country or group of countries if, a t the tim e of accession, either does not consent to  such 
application."
The Commission m entioned is the supreme decision-making body created by article 
2 0 0 1  of the NAFTA, it is form ed by "cabinet level representatives or their designees," to  
perform , among others, the following functions: "a) supervise the im plem entation of the  
agreem ent;" and ”b) oversee its further elaboration."
A  lot of praise should be shed on those negotiators of the NAFTA w ho insisted that 
the accession clause be left open. A lthough it is still too early to  exactly know w ho took  
the initiative in these m atters, rumor has it that the fac t that there is an accession clause at 
all can be credited to  the Canadian negotiators. H ow ever, the fac t th a t the accession 
clause w as left open to  the participation of any country, w ithout closing it geographically 
to  include only those countries from the W estern Hemisphere, is said to  be due to  the  
initiative of the M exican delegation.
Be it as it m ay, that the N AFTA  has an open accession clause protects it against the 
risk of its becoming another confirm ation for those w ho already see the world split in three 
neat blocs. The openness of the N A FTA 's  accession clause disproves some of the  
inevitability attributed to  this trend tow ards the form ation of blocs, which can be found 
among some of the most anxious observers of the international scene, apparently nostalgic 
about the neatness of the bipolar world gone-by.
Other indicators from the W estern  Hemisphere which deny this allegedly ubiquitous 
trend tow ards the form ation of a bloc in th a t part of the world can be found, for instance, 
in the recent creation at the Inter-Am erican Developm ent Bank (IDB) of a M ultilateral 
Investm ent Fund (M IF), to  improve the foreign investm ent clim ate in Latin Am erica and the 
Caribbean. Som etim es it is overlooked th a t, among the principal contributors to  the M IF, 
Japan has pledged $ 5 0 0  million, an am ount equivalent to the contribution of the United 
States. Additionally, the second largest contributor is Spain w ith  $ 5 0  million, follow ed by 
Germ any and France w ith  $ 3 0  million each, Italy w ith  $ 2 0  million and Portugal w ith  $4  
million.
Also in the W estern  Hem isphere, the accession clause as it appears in the N A FTA  is 
a reflection of w h at can be characterized as an open regionalism. The days seem to  be 
gone w hen the United S tates practiced the Monroe Doctrine to  exclude extraneous  
influences from  the W estern  Hem isphere. As gone seem to be the days w hen Latin 
Am erica and the Caribbean practiced a "defensive nationalism," w hich m anifested itself in 
attem pts  at economic integration oriented tow ards the protection of relatively m eager 
internal m arkets.
H ow ever, it is not enough th a t the accession clause is w ritten  in a w ay  which  
allows for the practice of an open regionalism, the appropriate signals must happen in order 
to  conclude that this is the case. Am ong these signals, probably the most im portant must
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come from the United S tates and it m ay come early, since it should happen w ith  the  
process of approval of the implementing legislation of the NAFTA.
For the United S tates to  become a credible partner in trade negotiations, the  
executive branch must obtain "fast track" authorization from the legislature. This reassures 
the negotiating partners of the United S tates that agreem ents will be approved or rejected  
by the legislature as negotiated.
The advantage of the "fast track" authorization w as recently confirmed w ith  the  
signature of the NAFTA. The new  Adm inistration requested the negotiation of additional 
agreem ents on the environm ent and labor standards, but the agreem ent itself will be 
subm itted for approval as it w as negotiated originally and it will have to  be voted as it is.
The same should be true of the possibility of extending the N A FTA to  other 
interested parties, through the accession clause. For this possibility to  enjoy any viability, 
the implementing legislation of the NAFTA will have to include a "fast track" authorization, 
guaranteeing th a t the accession agreem ents will only be approved or rejected as 
negotiated.
If the implementing legislation of the NAFTA in the United S tates does not contain a 
"fast track" authorization to  apply the accession clause, the process of trade liberalization  
in the Hemisphere will be devoid of viability. Simply, because the biggest trading partner 
will not have the credible means to carry out the required negotiations.
Beyond this essential requirement, the concrete steps which will have to be given 
depend from tw o  decisive factors. First, there is a need for leadership throughout a process 
which promises to be lengthy and protracted. Second, there is the need to  enhance the  
"readiness to  negotiate," by providing institutional support (W D W /1 4 /9 3 ) to  the  
governments and the private sectors of the acceding partners.
V III. 3 . THE NEED FOR LEADERSHIP 
(W D W /1 7 /9 3  16 JUNE 1 9 9 3 )
N ow  th a t the negotiations on the North Am erican Free Trade A greem ent (NAFTA) 
have entered into a decisive phase, focusing on the side agreem ents requested by the 
Clinton Adm inistration, the need for leadership to  com plete this com plex process has been 
w idely confirm ed. Even more so, w hen it is considered that a protracted and lengthy  
negotiation to  extend the NAFTA throughout the Hemisphere can be expected to  last at 
least for the rest of the present decade.
In normal tim es, leadership and an intense effort to  maintain a presence in 
W ashington, as the Mexican and the Canadian negotiators can verify , are tw o  of the most 
essential ingredients to carry out successfully a protracted negotiation w ith  the United 
States. In such normal circum stances, leadership should come from the United S tates. 
H ow ever, the turn tow ards the domestic in the United States will probably mean that
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leadership, once the fast track authorization to  im plem ent the N A FTA 's accession clause is 
approved (W D W /1 5 /9 3 ), m ay have to  com e from som ew here else.
Some of the consequences of the present introversion in the United S tates are 
already being fe lt. First, there is the abrupt manner in w hich some external issues have 
literally disappeared from the agenda in W ashington. Some of these external affairs cannot 
com pete against the need to  balance the budget or w ith  the debate over health care. 
Second, relatively more intense efforts are consequently required to  keep certain issues 
even at the bottom of the agenda. For instance, it has been estim ated in The Journal of 
Com m erce that M exico spent in 1991 betw een $ 7 5  and $ 1 0 0  million to  mobilize support 
for the NAFTA  negotiations. Finally, as illustrated by the debate on the N A FTA , the focus 
is alm ost exclusively on the internal consequences, such as the alleged "job losses" and 
the flight of investm ents south of the border, which the NAFTA  approval is supposed to  
precipitate. W h at M r. Perot has more graphically described as a "sucking sound" of 
investm ent and jobs.
These are some of the argum ents forcefully and quite effectively  presented by the  
heterogeneous coalition w here some strange bedfellows can be found, such as M r. Ross 
Perot, several environmental organizations, Mr. Ralph Nader, as well as organized labor and 
M IT  Professor Noam Chomsky.
Thus, leadership in these exceptional tim es of introversion in the United S tates will 
have to  come from som ew here else, particularly from the other tw o  m em bers of NAFTA.
For some tim e, M exico will remain the least interested in N A FTA 's extension to other 
trading partners, if only because it m ay w an t to  enjoy for a while its new ly obtained m arket 
access and build its m arket share.
The most viable alternative is for Canada to  assume such leadership role during the  
forthcom ing negotiations to  extend the N A FTA . As characterized by University of British 
Columbia Professor Ivan Head, Canada's multilateral vocation comes from  its inability "to 
protect its territory or its environm ent from  its im m ediate neighbors," w hich has made 
"cooperation w ith  o thers...the chosen route of Canadian foreign policy and Canadian  
diplom acy." Consequently, Canada "has long chosen to hone its skills and concentrate its 
efforts along multilateral paths."
There are indications th a t Canada is already assuming such a leading role. For 
instance, Canada's decision to join the NAFTA negotiations secured the multilateral 
character of the agreem ent. A lso, one of the most im portant reasons for joining the NAFTA  
negotiations had to  do w ith  Canada's deliberate avoidance of the relatively more inefficient 
alternative represented by the em ergence of the United S tates, through bilateral treaties, as 
"the hub of a rimless w heel."
Professor Ronald J. W onnacott, of the University of W estern Ontario, coined this 
phrase to describe the outcom e represented by the "exclusive bilateral 'spoke' 
agreem ents" which the United S tates would "sign w ith  any other countries individually." In 
Professor W onnacott's  term s, w ritten  before Canada decided to join the NAFTA  
negotiations, to  prevent the "U .S .-centered  rimless w heel" w as "the most im portant reason 
for Canada to  trilateralise the negotiations." Furthermore, for the same reasons. Professor 
W onnacott suggested Canada "should also in the future similarly seek to ensure the
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'trilateralising' of any succeeding negotiations betw een the United S tates and any other 
country."
Finally, as part of w h at can be term ed the "readiness to  negotiate," certain  
conditions will be required by the United S tates to  begin negotiations. As spelled by the  
Departm ent of Com m erce and the O ffice of the U. S. Trade Representative (USTR), these  
conditions comprise a stable m acroeconomic environm ent and m arket-oriented policies; 
active participation in the GATT; openness to  foreign investm ent and trade in services; and 
world class intellectual property protection. Briefly, these requirements basically include 
com m only agreed rules on the origin of products, safeguards, dispute settlem ent 
procedures and the conditions for future accession of non-m em bers, as well as restraints  
on subsidies, state trading and the use of foreign exchange restrictions.
H ow ever, beyond the fulfillm ent of these requirements and of the "readiness to  
negotiate," there is also the readiness to  carry out a deliberate e ffo rt in W ashington, to  
keep the negotiations on the agenda. O therw ise, the issue will be overwhelm ed by other 
relatively more salient and pressing m atters.
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IX. MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
IX . 1. SOUL-SEARCHING A T  THE W O RLD BANK 
(W D W /4 /9 3  10 FEBRUARY 1 9 9 3 )
President Lewis T . Preston has taken another step in the path of adapting the W orld  
Bank to  his m anagem ent style. About a year ago, the organizational structure w as  
"delayered" by eliminating the senior vice-presidencies and creating an inner circle of three  
Managing Directors. Second, poverty reduction w as reaffirm ed as the overriding objective 
of Bank's activities. Third, on January 1st. of this year, the three main com ponents of the  
poverty reduction e ffo rt-h u m an  resource developm ent, private sector developm ent and 
environm entally sustainable d eve lo p m en t-w ere  elevated to the rank of vice-president, to  
replace the Vice-Presidency for Sector Operations Policy. Finally, in October, the Board of 
Directors received a quite candid assessm ent of the m anagem ent of the Bank's portfolio of 
projects. This last is the m ost inward-looking of all the steps. In President Preston's term s, 
it is "a frank and exceedingly useful report."
In February 1 9 9 2 , a task force on portfolio m anagem ent w as created under the 
chairmanship of Mr. Willi W apenhans, one of the m ost experienced senior vice-presidents, 
w ho had decided to  retire. The m andate for the task force w as to  conduct a review  and to  
m ake recom m endations for improving the Banks' portfolio m anagem ent and evaluation  
process. Initially, the task force interpreted the scope of its inquiry as to  analyze the  
"dow nstream " stages of the project cycle, from negotiations through im pact evaluation. 
The scope w as  extended to  include also those factors w hich a ffec t the quality of projects 
w hen they enter the portfolio, the "upstream " stages of the project cycle, such as 
identification, preparation and appraisal, as well as others th a t influence the process of 
learning from experience.
The findings of the task force are quite impressive. First of all, just the dimension of 
the portfolio can serve as an indication of the m agnitude of the Bank's im pact. The lending 
com m itm ents of the Bank and the International Developm ent Association (IDA) amounted  
to  close to $ 1 4 0  billion, w ith  annual disbursements against 1 1 3  country portfolios, 
containing about 1 8 0 0  projects, reaching $ 1 6 .5  billion in FY 92  and expected to  increase to  
$ 2 0 .4  billion in FY93.
According to the task m anager's m emorandum of transmission, there is "no cause 
for alarm in the state of the portfolio." In F Y 9 1 , "8 0  percent of the current portfolio w as  
estim ated to  be performing w ell," w hile the rest "w as incurring major d ifficulties." This last 
figure is not considered "excessively high," since a very low figure "could imply the Bank 
w as not taking risks in a high-risk business." Some cause for concern is found in the 3 9  
percent of borrowing countries w ith  poorly performing portfolios, defined as countries in 
w hich "25  percent or more projects are problem projects."
H ow ever, the "main concern" is about the trend in portfolio perform ance, as 
revealed by the alm ost doubling of the share of problem projects, from 10 percent in F Y 79-
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81 to  17 percent in F Y 8 9 -9 1 . This proportion is present in alm ost all sectors, w ith  the  
exception of adjustm ent lending. By regions, Africa ranked last in projects' success rates 
w ith  5 9  percent, preceded by Latin Am erica w ith  6 2  percent. Thus, in M r. Preston's term s, 
the report "validates my initial concerns th a t all is not w ell w ith  the results of Bank- 
financed projects and w ith  the processes and procedures w hich a ffec t lending, supervision 
and im plem entation."
The factors that are contributing to  the decline in project performance are found at 
the global level, such as the oil shocks, the debt crisis, and declining term s of trade. A t the  
country level operate other factors, such as deteriorating institutional, policy and 
macroeconom ic environments.
Finally, Bank practices are also contributing to  the decline, such as a "pervasive 
preoccupation w ith  new  lending," as part of an "approval culture" which emphasizes 
"tim ely loan approval." Mr. Preston recognizes th a t tension has "alw ays existed" betw een  
"new  com m itm ents" and "effective im plem entation."
The problem is that this emphasis on loan approval "is not m atched by equal 
emphasis on im plem entation planning and identification and assessment of major risks to  
project perform ance." Even "the Bank's role in supporting project im plem entation is 
inadequately defined." A project-by-project approach prevails in portfolio perform ance  
m anagem ent, while country-w ide im plem entation review s still are far from being a standard 
practice. Also, the Bank's evaluation system  gives inadequate attention to  developm ent 
im pact.
These are the major difficulties and the report presents six recom m endations: 1) 
introduce country portfolio performance m anagem ent; 2) allow country-portfolio  
restructuring, including reallocation of undisbursed balances; 3) improve the quality of 
projects entering the portfolio; 4) define the Bank's role in project performance 
m anagem ent; 5) enhance the evaluations departm ent's role as an instrum ent of 
accountability; and 6) create an internal environm ent, by reordering priorities and incentive 
system s, to  ensure emphasis on portfolio performance m anagem ent.
These recom m endations, according to  President Preston, are equivalent to  a 
"cultural shift tow ards a better balance betw een w ork on new  com m itm ents and the  
effective  use of previously approved operations." For President Preston the W orld Bank 
"m ust change the institutional values which determ ine our approach to  new  operations and 
supervision of the existing portfolio."
IX . 2. THE IM F-W ORLD BANK SPRING MEETING  
(W D W /1 3 /9 3  19 M A Y 1 993 )
During this year's Fund-Bank spring meetings, alm ost everybody received a pat in 
the back. The som etim es acrimonious confrontations among the industrialized countries 
w ere conspicuously absent. T w o  issues w ere a t the top of the agenda: first, a cooperative  
strategy for the restoration of non-inflationary grow th among the industrialized economies
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and second, aid to the form er centrally planned economies. Both issues had been well 
prepared, by m eans of w h a t Undersecretary of the U .S . Treasury Lawrence Summers 
characterized as "discrete, private com m unications," w hich contributed to  a clear 
im provem ent in the tone of the discussions.
The substantive discussions took place in the Group of Seven (G -7 ), w hich includes 
the Finance Ministers and the Central Bank Governors of Canada, France, Germ any, Italy, 
Japan, the United Kingdom and the United S tates, under the chairmanship of the new  U.S. 
Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen.
The "cooperative strategy for the restoration of non-inflationary grow th" aims at 
"putting the world econom y on the path to  economic recovery and sustained grow th,"  
based on "sound m acroeconom ic policies, structural reforms and an open international 
trading system ."
For this purpose, the G -7 w elcom ed the program for economic revitalization of the  
new  Adm inistration in W ashington, w hose "positive effects  are already visible in a 
substantial reduction in long-term  interest rates." In Europe, the G-7 recognized th a t there  
w as "room for a further decline in interest rates that should m ake a substantial contribution  
to  grow th ." Finally, the announcem ent of a substantial stimulus package by Japan w as  
seen as "a w elcom e contribution tow ard  the im portant goal of sustained non-inflationary  
grow th based on increased dom estic dem and, which will contribute to  reduce the large 
external im balance."
On the economic assistance for the form er centrally planned econom ies, the G-7  
supported the results of the Russian referendum  and the multilateral support package 
announced in Tokyo, as well as "the W orld Bank's Oil Rehabilitation Loan and the IM F's  
prompt action in establishing the new  System ic Transform ation Facility."
For the first tim e in m any years, the G -7 made reference to  the need for "structural 
reform s," to  strengthen long-term grow th  and bring dow n unem ploym ent. Reflecting the  
changes in W ashington, the G -7 listed the following measures: "labor m arket reform s and 
greater flexibility in markets; m easures to  increase savings and investm ent; the redirection 
of governm ent spending tow ard investm ent in physical and human capital; curbing the  
burgeoning cost of health care; and addressing the economic effec ts  of aging populations." 
Furthermore, a report on these "structural reforms" will be subm itted by the Ministers of 
Finance to  the Tokyo Sum m it.
Other issues which threatened to  destroy the harmony w ere previously brought 
under control. For instance, the appreciation of the Japanese yen w as becoming 
contentious, on April 2 8 , w hen  the yen h it a record low  of 1 0 9 .5  per dollar. H ow ever, on 
the same day. Secretary of the Treasury Bentsen in testim ony before the Senate  
Appropriations Com m ittee declared th a t "excessive volatility in exchange rates is 
counterproductive for grow th ." The Federal Reserve also began intervening, aggressively 
selling yen, which pushed it by the end o f the day to  1 1 1 .7 0 . The same term s used by 
Secretary Bentsen appear in the G -7 com m unique, saying that "exchange rates should 
reflect econom ic fundam entals and th a t excessive volatility is undesirable." Finally, the G-7
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confirmed that "a successful grow th strategy requires prompt and appropriate conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round."
The meetings of the other com m ittees essentially reflected the contents of the G -7  
communique. For instance, the Group of Ten (G -10) dealt w ith  a single issue, based on a 
report prepared by the deputies on "international capital m ovem ents and foreign exchange 
m arkets."
The same happened w ith  the Developm ent Com m ittee m eeting, dedicated as w ell to  
a single issue, the access by the developing countries to  private capital flow s. This meeting  
alm ost becam e an academ ic seminar. In an unusual step, the new  Developm ent Com m ittee  
chairm an, M inister of S tate and Head of CORDIPLAN of Venezuela, Ricardo Haussm an, in 
addition to  the docum entation prepared by the Bank and the Fund, requested  
supplem entary papers, both from members of the com m ittee and from independent 
experts.
The Interim Com m ittee issued a "declaration on cooperation for sustained global 
expansion," ratifying the decisions already adopted by the G -7 and by the IM F 's  Executive 
Board. Support w as granted to the creation of the new  System ic Transform ation Facility 
(STF), characterized by the IM F's Managing Director Michel Camdessus as a tem porary  
facility, "designed to be a precursor." Also, the Interim Com m ittee supported the IM F 's  
Executive Board efforts to  find a successor to  the Enhanced Structural Adjustm ent Facility 
(ESAF), for low-incom e members.
Even the communique issued by the G -24  of the developing countries w as  
celebrated for its lack of confrontational language. For instance, on the creation of the STF 
the Ministers of the G -24  "noted that countries th a t qualify for Fund assistance under the  
system ic transform ation facility (STF) are not restricted to one region, and called on the  
Fund to  give due attention to the needs of all members that are experiencing balance of 
paym ents difficulties associated w ith  system ic economic transform ations."
IX . 3 . 'GETTING RESULTS' A T  THE W ORLD BANK 
(W D W /2 2 /9 3  28  JULY 1 9 9 3 )
This is the title of a brochure released by the W orld Bank describing the recent 
endorsem ent by the Board of Directors of an "agenda for improving developm ent 
effectiveness," based on the recommendations of w h at is known as the "W apenhans  
Report" (W D W /4 /9 3 ).
W here and how the W orld Bank intends to put its m oney determ ines in e ffe c t the  
developm ent agenda as a w hole, on account of its relative w eight. For instance, the Bank's 
portfolio contains 1 8 0 0  projects, amounting to $ 1 4 0  billion and generating around $ 3 7 0  
billion in investm ents, distributed in 1 1 3  individual country portfolios. Just in fiscal year 
(FY) 1 9 9 3 , new  lending com m itm ents to developing countries by both the Bank and the  
International Developm ent Association (IDA) totalled a record $ 2 3 .7  billion, compared to
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$ 2 1 .7  billion in FY 92 . Gross disbursements in FY 93  from both IBRD/IDA am ounted to  
$ 1 8 .0  billion, compared w ith  $ 1 6 .5  billion a year earlier.
By regions, during F Y 93 , Latin Am erica and the Caribbean received the largest 
proportion of new  com m itm ents from both IBRD/IDA, amounting to  $ 6 .2  billion, basically 
dedicated in the largest countries to  institutional developm ent, the environm ent and human 
resource developm ent.
Also, contrary to  common beliefs, adjustm ent lending has been decreasing, 
amounting in FY 93 to  19 percent of total IBRD/IDA new  com m itm ents, compared to  27  
percent for the previous fiscal year.
The decision of the Board of Directors adopting the recom m endations of the  
W apenhans report constitute "a wide-ranging action plan to  improve the perform ance of 
the projects and programs" financed by the World Bank group. The action plan contains 
the following elem ents: 1 ) the m anagem ent of country portfolios, instead of individual 
projects, will become the focus to  evaluate effectiveness and future lending; 2) to  
restructure the entire portfolio, instead of only individual nonperforming projects; 3) to  
improve the quality of new  operations entering the portfolio; 4 ) to  increase the resources 
dedicated to supervision as a m eans to  reinforce project and program im plem entation; 5) to  
enhance the evaluation of operations, focusing on w hether benefits are sustainable; and 6) 
to  change institutional behavior and attitudes, through changes in s ta ff and in performance 
incentives, aimed at a better balance betw een approving new  operations and ensuring the 
success of those in progress.
The im plem entation of this action plan entails the enactm ent of some profound 
changes in traditional Bank operating procedures, which will require leadership and 
determ ination to  overcome the natural resistance to  change ingrained in the inertia 
characteristic of a w ell-entrenched bureaucracy.
For instance, the whole portfolio of Bank-supported operations in a country will 
become "the 'unit of account' by w hich the Bank will measure its own effectiveness." This 
dem ands the utilization of at least tw o  principal mechanisms. First, perform ance review s  
will have to be carried out for the country as a w hole, covering m acroeconom ic, as well as 
world economic conditions, including com m odity prices and international interest rates. 
Second, since future lending will depend on the im plem entation of current operations, the  
Bank will have to assume a larger responsibility in implementing country assistance 
strategies.
The issue of nonperforming projects som etim es will be more effective ly  confronted  
by m eans of restructuring the country portfolio as a w hole, particularly w hen specific 
rem edies have proved unsuccessful. In some cases, this m ay lead to the cancellation of 
certain projects and to the restructuring or redesign of others, including substantial 
reductions in Bank financing.
To  improve the quality of operations certain actions by the borrowers will have a 
much greater e ffec t, such as a sense of ownership and com m itm ent. H ow ever, this poses 
a challenge of delivering the assistance required by the borrowing countries, whose  
capacity to conceive, design and im plem ent projects is often w eak. As described by an
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Executive Director, "the challenge for the Bank is to  change the w ays it interacts w ith  
borrowers, from  a pattern dominated by prescription, imposition, condition-setting, and 
decisionmaking to  one characterized by explanation, dem onstration, facilitation and 
advice."
Loan supervision demands clear im plem entation plans, close monitoring and 
assessm ent of progress, through midterm reviews and the expansion of the number and 
role of field offices. Also, operations evaluation demands the perform ance of im pact 
evaluations, focused on country portfolios, as w ell as diversified specific studies.
Finally, the changes in staffing and resources demand a different m ix of skills, 
focused on "institutional building, public sector m anagem ent, and social sciences other 
than econom ics," as well as changes in promotion policies to  reward portfolio  
m anagem ent, rather than project approval. As recalled in M ay 1 9 9 3  by President Lewis  
Preston, "the Bank's objective in lending is to  reduce poverty. On-the-ground b e n e fits -  
rather than loan approvals-should be the measure of our success." To accomplish such a 
purpose, he concluded, "w e are changing our processes and w e are changing our incentive 
system ."
IX. 4 . THE IM F 'S  A NNU AL REPORT
(W D W /2 4 /9 3  15 SEPTEMBER 1 9 9 3 )
As every year, before the annual m eetings of the Board of Governors, the Executive 
Board releases the Annual Report reviewing the International M onetary Fund's performance 
in the financial year ending on April 30 .
The first part of the Report contains a description of the main developm ents that 
took place in the world econom y during 1 9 9 2  and early 1 9 9 3 . It review s the most recent 
trade policy developm ents and a summary of three discussions of the W orld Economic 
Outlook (WEO) . The second part contains a description of policies and activities, including 
surveillance activities; financial support for m em bers' policies; technical assistance and 
financial operations.
Against the background of a world econom y experiencing a recovery "below  
expectations," the Fund carried out the surveillance of the m em bers' policies and 
perform ance. This is done by means of yearly individual consultations and m ultilaterally  
through tw o  regular discussions in the Board of the world economic outlook, on Septem ber 
1 9 9 2  and April 1 9 9 3  (W D W /1 3 /9 3 ), and an additional discussion held in Decem ber 1 9 9 2  
(W D W /7 /9 3 ).
Several major changes are testing the IM F 's  role of overseeing the functioning of 
the international m onetary system . This "tim e of almost unprecedented changes in the  
international econom y" has led to  w hat is characterized as "the most significant set of 
developm ents to  have faced the IMF in recent years." Among these changes, the enlarged 
membership is "forem ost," since it has made the IM F a "near-universal institution."
Second, several m embers are "undergoing the difficult transition to  m arket-oriented
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econom ies." Third, the "record number of countries w hich are being assisted by the IM F." 
Fourth, "the number of countries that have taken steps to rem ove restrictions . . . and 
open up their econom ies." And finally, "the major efforts in regional integration th a t are 
under w ay ."
This expansion in membership during the last financial year, from 1 5 7  to  1 7 7 , and 
the quota increases due to the Ninth General Review , in e ffec t since Novem ber 1 9 9 2 ,  
raised total IM F quotas by alm ost 6 0  percent, from  SDR 9 1 .2  billion a t the end of April 
1 9 9 2  to  SDR 1 4 4 .6  billion a t the end of April 1 9 9 3 . Only the initial quotas of the new  
m em bers w ho joined the IM F during the same period amounted to  SDR 6 .2  billion of the  
quota increase. Additionally, both the quota subscriptions by the new  mem bers and the  
quota increases more than doubled the Fund's liquid resources. Thus, as of the end of 
April 1 9 9 3 , IM F 's  liquidity reached record levels, since "adjustable and uncom m itted usable 
resources totaled SDR 5 2 .2  billion, com pared to  SDR 2 0 .9  billion a year earlier.”
A  tem porary System ic Transform ation Facility w as created "to extend financial 
assistance to members experiencing severe disruptions in their trade and paym ents  
arrangem ents due to a shift from  significant reliance on trading a t nonm arket prices to  
m ultilateral, m arket-based trade."
Additionally, in August 1 9 9 2 , a Technical Assistance Secretariat w as created w ithin  
the Fund "to provide a focal point" for responding to  the demands of the new  members.
Y e t, only 11 stand-by arrangem ents totaling SDR 2 .0  billion, and 3 extended  
arrangem ents totaling SDR 1 .2  billion w ere  approved in 1 9 9 2 /9 3 . Of these eleven stand-by 
arrangem ents, 4  w ere in Central Europe (Albania, the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Romania); 3  w ere to the Baltic S tates (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania); one w as  for Russia; 
and the remaining three w en t to the W estern  Hemisphere (Costa Rica, G uatem ala, and 
Uruguay).
The am ount of these stand-by arrangem ents w as alm ost half the total level of 
com m itm ents approved in the previous year, amounting to  SDR 8.1 billion. The explanation  
for this decrease in activities is "the improved economic perform ance of m any developing  
countries, particularly in the W estern  Hem isphere, while the expected large demand for use 
of IM F resources from m any of the IM F 's  new  mem bers had not yet m aterialized."
During financial year 1 9 9 2 /9 3 , m em bers' purchases (drawings) remained the same 
as the previous year, amounting to  SDR 5 .3  billion, while repurchases (repaym ents) 
decreased to  SDR 4.1 billion, from  SDR 4 .8  billion. In all, in 1 9 9 2 /9 3 , the net resource 
transfer to  the m em ber countries increased from SDR 0 .5  billion of the last financial year, 
to  SDR 1 .2  billion.
The overdue financial obligations to  the Fund "remained high in 1 9 9 2 /9 3 ."
H ow ever, "for the first tim e in a decade" there w as a decline in the am ount of arrears, 
from SDR 3 .5  billion at the end of April 1 9 9 2  to SDR 3 .0  billion at the end of April 1 9 9 3 .
Also, Peru elim inated its arrears w ith  the successful completion of its program of 
rights accum ulation; thus, its ineligibility to  use the Fund's general resources w as lifted on
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March 13 , 1 9 9 3 . As a consequence, a t the end of financial year 1 9 9 2 /9 3 , no countries in 
the W estern  Hemisphere w ere in arrears w ith  the Fund.
Finally, for the performance of these duties the Fund's regular s ta ff increased from  
1861 persons from 107  countries in 1 9 9 1 /9 2  to  more than 2 ,1 0 0  from 1 1 4  countries in 
1 9 9 2 /9 3 . Consequently, the total administrative budget increased in 1 9 9 2 /9 3  from  US 
$ 3 3 8  million in the previous financial year to  US $ 3 8 9  million.
IX . 5 . THE W ORLD BANK'S A NNUAL REPORT 
(W D W /2 5 /9 3  22  SEPTEMBER 1 9 9 3 )
Covering the fiscal year (FY) from 1 July 1 9 9 2  to  3 0  June 1 9 9 3 , the W orld Bank's 
Annual Report contains the following sections: 1) The Executive Board's activities; 2) a 
global perspective of the economic scene; 3) the Bank's operations in FY 9 3 ; 4 ) the Bank's 
finances; 5) the activities of the members of the W orld Bank Group, including those of the  
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the M ultilateral Investm ent Guarantee Agency  
(M IG A ), and the International Centre for Settlem ent of Investm ent Disputes (ICSID); 6) 
regional perspectives, w ith  a special segm ent dedicated to  Latin Am erica and the  
Caribbean; and 7) a summary of the projects approved during FY 9 3 .
The admission of sixteen new  m em bers, among them  eleven republics of the form er 
Soviet Union and tw o  remaining Baltic states, brought total membership to  1 7 6 , which  
brings the Bank close to universality. Action was pending on membership for Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, Eritrea, Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Total new  lending com m itm ents by the W orld Bank Group in FY 9 3  am ounted to  
$ 2 3 .7  billion, of which $ 1 6 .9  billion for 1 2 2  projects from the Bank and $ 6 .8  billion for 
1 2 3  projects from the International Developm ent Agency (IDA). These figures represented  
an increase from FY 9 2 , from $ 1 5 .2  billion for 1 1 2  Bank projects and $ 6 .6  billion for 1 1 0  
IDA  projects. Net disbursements by the Bank increased in FY 9 3  to  $ 2 .4  billion, from  $ 1 .8  
billion in FY 9 2 . ID A 's  net disbursements also increased from $ 4 .4  billion in FY 9 2  to  $ 4 .5  
in FY 9 3 .
By sectors, structural adjustm ent lending operations experienced an impressive 
decrease from 27  percent of total lending in FY 9 2 , to 17 percent of new  com m itm ents in 
FY 9 3 . By contrast, lending for human-resource developm ent, comprising education, 
population, health and nutrition, accounted for 16 percent of total Bank lending in FY 9 3 . 
Still, agriculture and rural developm ent received the largest percentage of com m itm ents in 
FY 9 3 , w ith  1 3 .8  percent, followed closely by transportation w ith  1 3 .4  percent. W ith  the  
increase in lending for human-resource developm ent, the Bank is approaching rapidly the  
goal stated by President Lewis Preston th a t "poverty reduction must be the benchm ark  
against which (the Bank's) performance must be judged."
The segm ent dedicated to  Latin Am erica and the Caribbean describes the economic 
recovery experienced by the region, w ith  the notable exception of Brazil which influences 
heavily regional averages. Even so, it is noted that "the economic recovery of the region is
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even more remarkable in the context of an international environm ent th a t has provided 
limited opportunities for export grow th ."
Other bright spots highlighted from  the region's evolution are first, the sharp decline 
in inflation, w hich w as particularly noticeable in Argentina, Nicaragua and Peru. Second, 
the "strong stabilization programs in the region, combined w ith  relatively low  interest rates 
in the United S tates, have provided an environm ent th a t has attracted a substantial inflow  
of capital to  the more successful adjusting countries (Argentina, Colombia, Chile, M exico  
and Venezuela)." Finally, "the establishm ent of stable economies w ith  low  tariffs  has laid 
the basis for renew ed discussions on regional integration."
In FY 9 3 , Bank activities in Latin Am erica and the Caribbean can be summarized as 
follows: 1) total new  com m itm ents increased to $6.1  billion from  $ 5 .6  billion in FY 9 2 ; 2) 
gross disbursements of $5.1 billion w ere  higher than the $ 3 .9  billion of FY 9 2 , while  
repaym ents of alm ost $ 4 .4  billion yielded positive net disbursements of $ 7 6 9  million; 3) 
how ever, interest and charges of $3.1  billion led to  a negative net transfer of $ 2 .3  billion.
In the near future, considering "the revival of capital flow s" into Latin Am erica and 
the Caribbean, "the Bank's accent today in the larger countries of the region is less on 
resource transfers and more on institutional developm ent, human-resource developm ent, 
the environm ent, and natural-resource m anagem ent." In the other countries of the region 
the Bank will continue operating "consultative groups and other mechanisms to  mobilize 
external assistance."
Finally, during FY 9 3 , particular attention w as given to  the issue of portfolio 
m anagem ent, a fter an internal task force led by form er vice-president W apenhans revealed  
th a t the quality of the Bank's portfolio had declined (W D W /4 ,2 2 /9 3 ) . A lso, the creation of 
three new  vice-presidencies "to provide enhanced support and leadership in critical-poverty  
related areas: human resource developm ent, finance and private sector developm ent and 
environm entally sustainable developm ent."
A t the end of FY 9 3 , the Bank employed 6 ,1 9 7  regular and fixed term  s ta ff, of 
w hom  4 ,0 0 5  w ere higher-level s ta ff from  121 nations, 58  percent from industrialized  
countries and the remaining 4 2  percent from  developing countries. During FY 9 3 , the Bank 
hired 2 3 9  new  higher-level s ta ff, of w hom  1 4 0  w ere to  support Bank's activities in the  
republics of the form er Soviet Union. The proportion of w om en employed as higher-level 
sta ff during FY 9 3  increased from 2 7 .4  percent of the total to  2 8 .4  percent. The Bank's 
adm inistrative budget increased by 11 percent, to $ 1 .3 8  billion for FY 9 4 , from $ 1 .2 5  
billion in FY 9 2 .
IX . 6. THE IM F-W O RLD BANK A N N U A L MEETINGS  
(W D W /2 7 /9 3  6 OCTOBER 1 9 9 3 )
A world econom y undergoing, w h a t the IM F 's  W orld Economic Outlook (W EO) 
(W D W /2 6 /9 3 )  described as, its "fourth consecutive year of sub-par grow th perform ance"
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furnished the background for the annual m eetings of the W orld Bank and the IM F, held in 
W ashington on Septem ber 2 4 -3 0 .
• Several changes in the style of conducting the meetings w ere noticeable, w ith  some
of these changes probably resulting from  the new  Adm inistration in W ashington. For 
instance, from the cryptic communiques issued by the G-Seven and particularly by the G- 
, Ten , the center of gravity of the meetings displaced itself to  the Interim and Developm ent
Com m ittees. Second, open m anifestations of disagreem ent, if there w ere  any, w ere  kept 
w ithin closed quarters. Third, by contrast w ith  the Reagan and Bush Adm inistrations, the  
President of the United S tates did not participate in the inauguration ceremonies.
Still, one of the high points of this year's meetings w as  contained in the  
communique issued by the G-Seven Finance Ministers a fter m eeting w ith  their colleague 
Boris Fedorov from  Russia. The G-Seven "praised president Yeltsin 's com m itm ent to  
pursue the path of m arket-oriented reform" and "reaffirm ed their com m itm ent to the  
program of support agreed on in Tokyo in April."
H ow ever, it w as the Interim Com m ittee that expressed "concern" about the  
continued w eak grow th performance in industrial countries and the high and rising rates of 
unem ploym ent and persistent protectionist pressures." Also, the Interim Com m ittee  
stressed "the need for Fund members to continue action to  promote a robust recovery and 
a sustained expansion."
Another high point, briefly mentioned in the communique of the Developm ent 
C om m ittee, "w elcom ed the outstanding contribution to the Middle East Peace Process 
made by the W orld Bank in preparing the ground for a coordinated program of financial 
support for Gaza and the W est Bank."
Finally, the return of South Africa to  the international financial com m unity w as  
marked by the vote in the U .S . Senate that rescinded a ban on IM F lending to  that country. 
This w as followed by a meeting betw een African National Congress (ANC) leader Nelson 
Mandela and the IM F 's  Managing Director Michel Camdessus. Upon the conclusion of this  
m eeting, the IMF announced the preparation of the first disbursement for South Africa of 
an $ 8 5 0  million credit to  com pensate for a dram atic drop in exports.
No specific mention appeared in the communiques about Latin Am erica, particularly 
because the much expected results of the conversations betw een the Brazilian Finance 
Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso and the IMF Managing Director Camdessus never 
happened. The communique of the Developm ent Com m ittee only registered the assumption  
of the chair by M r. Rudolf Hom m es, Minister of Finance of Colombia, to  replace the retiring 
chairperson, M inister Ricardo Hausmann of Venezuela.
» Other highlights that took place during the meetings had to  do more w ith  decisions
th a t should be adopted, rather than w ith  more positive outcom es. For instance, the  
Director General of G A TT, the President of the W orld Bank and the Managing Director of 
, the IM F issued a joint declaration demanding the successful conclusion of the Uruguay
Round.
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Am ong the main points, the tripartite declaration said th a t "uncertainty about 
industrial nations' com m itm ent to  the m ultilateral trading system  puts at risk the success 
of m any countries that have unilaterally liberalized their trading regimes in recent years and 
discourages others from following in their footsteps."
The three chief executives conclude their s tatem ent saying that "w ith  so much at 
stake, political hesitations and vested interests must be put aside." Consequently, 
"courageous and visionary decisions need to  be made quickly to  conclude the Uruguay  
Round and thereby contribute to a return to substantial and sustainable econom ic grow th ."
Finally, one promise and one non-decision may be more illustrative of w hat 
happened a t the meetings. First, there is agreem ent about the establishm ent of a successor 
facility  to  the IM F 's  Enhanced Structural Adjustm ent Facility (ESAF), created in Decem ber 
1 9 8 7 , "to provide concessional financing to  back adjustm ent by the poorest countries."
The last new  lending com m itm ents from the ESAF must be done by the end of November 
1 9 9 3  and the successor facility will operate by making com m itm ents until 1 9 9 6 , to  be 
disbursed through 1 9 9 9 .
The non-decision had to do w ith  the global need for a new  allocation of SDRs. In 
response to a decision adopted last April by the Interim C om m ittee, the IM F 's  m anagem ent 
has com e out in support Of an allocation of SDR 3 6  billion. This is considered "reasonable 
to  atta in  the m odest objective of beginning to reverse the declining im portance of the SDR 
in m em bers' international reserves." Such an increase would raise "the present share of 
SDRs in world international reserves to  the average of the last tw o  decades, or 5 .3  
percent."
The reaction by the Interim Com m ittee did not close the door to  a new  SDR  
allocation soon. The Com m ittee requested that the IM F's Executive Board "continue its 
w ork on these issues-having particularly in mind the situation of the m any new  m embers  
th a t have not participated in previous SDR allocations-and to report to  the Com m ittee at 
its next m eeting, to  be held in W ashington, D .C . on April 2 5 , 1 9 9 4 ."
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